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I. INTRODUCTION
The current multiple network environment in the United States is
undergoing significant change as a result of the phenomena of network
and media convergence and the provision of network services outside
the heretofore traditional rubric of common carriage via the public
switched network. The convergence phenomena can be seen in the
merger of fiber optic, telephone and computer technologies into broad-
[Vol. 55:1085
HeinOnline  -- 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1086 1993-1994
PRIVATE NETWORKS, PUBLIC SPEECH
band telecommunications networks technology. Convergence is also evi-
dent in the disintegration of distinctions between video distribution and
public switched networks as technology, government policy and user
demand combine to introduce inter-industry competition into the na-
tion's video distribution, inter-exchange and local exchange markets.1
The movement from service provision via common carrier to private
carriage can be seen in several developments as well. They include pri-
vate and common carrier responses to the growing demand for special-
ized communication services. It is estimated that as much as a third of
the nation's total yearly telecommunications investment is channelled
into private networks, virtual private networks and related hybrid
services.
Reliance on private investment in the construction and servicing of
the public switched network infrastructure is also the chosen vehicle for
building the broadband electronic super-highway, which many believe
will be the logical evolution of the public switched network and its
more private analogues.2
1. The speed with which various industry firms seek to joint venture or combine to enter
new markets underscores this fact. See Alan Deutschman, The Next Big Info Tech Battle, FOR-
TUNE, Nov. 29, 1993, at 39; John Greenwald & John F. Dickerson, WIRED! Bell Atlantics Bid
for Cable Giant TCI is the Biggest Media Deal in History, TIME, Oct. 25, 1993, at 50; John Huey
& Andrew Kupfer, What That Merger Means for You, FORTUNE, Nov. 15, 1993, at 82; Policing
the Information Highway, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 26, 1993, § 1, at 30; Julie Solomon, Big Brother's
Holding Company, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 25, 1993, at 38; Sandra Sugawara & Paul Farhi, Merger to
Create a Media Giant, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1993, at Al; and The Tangled Web They Weave,
THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 1993, at 21.
2. For instance, the Clinton administration has made clear that they have resolved the ques-
tion of who will build the electronic highways in favor of private industry. The Clinton administra-
tion's report entitled, National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action (NII) identifies
four principal policy goals and five major action areas. The four principal policy goals are: (1)
reliance on private sector investment; (2) support for universal service; (3) promotion of technical
innovation and new applications; and (4) promotion of a seamless user driven NIL. These goals are
to be accomplished via reformation of government regulatory policies concerning: information se-
curity and network reliability; improved spectrum management; protection of intellectual property
rights; increased domestic and international inter-governmental coordination; and enhanced access
to government information concomitant with improvement of the procurement process. See The
National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action, Info. Infrastructure Task Force, Sept.
15, 1993, at pp. 1-2, 4-16. See generally John Holliman, Vice President Gore Press Conference on
Info Highways, Transcript No. 267-1 of live report, CNN News, Dec. 21, 1993; Ronald Brown,
Secretary Brown on Three Goals for Our New National Information Infrastructure, Address at
the Telecommunications Policy Briefing-Roll Call (Nov. 15, 1993); Brooks Boliek, U.S. Data
Superhighway Project Short on Concrete, THE HOLLYWOOD REP., Sept. 16, 1993, at 1, 31.
The Clinton administration's reliance on private sector investment and privatization of net-
work infrastructure is a pragmatic policy developed in a time of decreasing public revenues. Sole
reliance on pro competition policies, however, will not adequately protect individual and group
speech and related activities fostered by broadband intelligent networks or existing telecommuni-
1994] 1087
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As these changes occur, one of the critical questions for First
Amendment theorists and scholars concerned with mass media and
telecommunications is what access and speech rights will network own-
ers and users have after the convergence and privatization of the mass
media and telecommunications networks?3
As the convergence phenomenon intersects with the growing reli-
ance on private as opposed to public common carriage provision of net-
work services, there are potential dangers to access and broad-based
speech opportunities. Privatizing the ownership of the technologies and
networks can lead to the concentration of control over content in the
hands of private network owners. As a result of the historic tendency to
equate speech rights with ownership of the means of transmission,
privatizing the merging of technology, network function and informa-
cations networks. In the process of managing market entry and firm competition, current U.S.
competition policies run the risk of ceding creation and control of speech activities to private firms.
This is particularly true to the extent the First Amendment is read as a negative bar to govern-
ment action rather than an affirmative protection for speech activities.
Pro-competitive privatization policies do not directly address the need for preserving and ex-
panding electronic speech activities as a valid goal, and thus there is a significant risk of losing
opportunities for electronic speech and its related activities. Consequently the definition, preserva-
tion and expansion of electronic speech and its related activities must be elevated to a priority
policy goal and incorporated within the broader policy framework of the government's NII policy.
Many states have made the same decision in their pursuit of similar pro-competitive telecom-
munications policies. For instance, the state of New York has recently published a document
developed by the Governor's Telecommunications Exchange. The document, entitled "Connecting
to the Future," identifies numerous policies which it is suggested that the state pursue in acquiring
the economic benefits of an advanced telecommunications infrastructure. Among the key recom-
mendations is reliance on a competitive market to ensure greater consumer choice and higher
quality service. Unlike the federal government's NII report, however the New York report ac-
knowledges that the state retains an obligation to ensure a free flow of information and ideas.
CONNECTING TO THE FUTURE: GREATER AccEss. SERVICES, AND COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNI-
CATIONS. REP. OF THE N.Y. TELECOMMUNICATIONS EXCHANGE, Dec. 1993, at xii, 18-21, 28-29.
3. As fiber optic distribution and switching technology is introduced, the distribution func-
tions and information streams of broadcasting, cable and telephony are merging. As they merge,
the access, speech and related activities that received varying degrees of constitutional protection
when conducted over the antecedent technologies will come to reside on the merged networks.
Nevertheless, the fate of such rights in an advanced, intelligent, broadband network context is
unsettled because the apportionment of these constitutionally recognized rights was made in the
specific context of antecedent technologies and relationships. See generally Electronic Media Reg-
ulation and the First Amendment: Future Perspective, DATA CHANNELS, Feb. 3, 1992, at 4;
Joshua Quittner, Online To A Revolution: The Amazing-and Some Say Ominous-New World
of TV, Telephone and Computer Is Heading Your Way, NEWSDAY, July 18, 1993, at 4. This
uncertainty is exacerbated by the growing number of private networks.
Some scholars have begun to address this question. See EDGE, Dec. 2, 1991, at 6, 7; Special
Report: Universal Telephone Service; Ready for the 21st Century?, 1991 ANNUAL REVIEW OF
THE INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATION STUDIES (a Joint Program of Northern Telecom and the Aspen
Institute).
[Vol. 55:1085
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tion streams could effectuate a transfer of the current shared control
over access and speech from the current public/private constitutional
arrangement to private/contractual arrangements.4 Such a result could
be detrimental to the potential speech and access opportunities of ex-
isting and future network users of video, voice and data network infor-
mation services.5 Private owners may not be motivated by public inter-
est considerations of access and inclusion. Instead, their major
motivation to, provide access and speech to their employees is utilita-
rian, and their major motivation to serve a particular individual or
group of customers depends (in the most ideal sense) upon the desira-
bility of that individual or market as a customer base and their ability
to pay. These decisions are private, and thus there is arguably less op-
4. Inherent in the status of the ownership is an underlying bundle of property rights which
include control over who may have access to the network owners' facilities and/or services. While
the degree of control over access varies with the type of owner, ultimately, as long as ownership
includes the right to decide access, some segment of potential users are likely to be excluded for a
variety of oft-times unrelated reasons ranging from particular pricing or service configurations, to
equipment requirements, information format, capacity needs, or discrimination based on economic
or normative value considerations such as content of speech.
5. Users may be divided into two major groups composed of those who own network facili-
ties (facilities based users) and those who do not own facilities (non-facilities based users). The
vast majority of users are non-facilities based. These individuals, firms or groups purchase access
to some of the networks (telephone) over which they may interact. They are most often semi-
passive recipients of information transmitted one way over other networks (broadcasting and
cable). The communications needs of these users vary substantially, and are evolving at different
speeds and in multiple directions. For instance, many businesses already have significant needs for
high speed, high capacity broadband communication networks. See Michael L. Dertouzos, Build-
ing the Information Marketplace, 94 TECH. REv. 28, 31-32, Jan. 1991; and Gilder, infra note 10,
at 96; Michael L. Dertouzos, Communications, Computers and Networks, Sci. AM., Sept. 1991,
at 62, 64; Al Gore, Infrastructure for the Global Village, Sci. Am., Sept. 1991, at 150, 151. By
comparison, there is still significant uncertainty about what the general public's needs will be
regarding demands for greater network speeds and capacities. Current projections of consumer use
of the networks slated to comprise the information superhighway anticipate significant high end
(business) use given the wealth of enhanced and information services the network architecture is
likely to provide. But there is doubt that residential users will find the services desirable or afford-
able. See Gary Yaquinto, The Information Superhighway; Construction Ahead: What Regulators
Should Ask About the Information Superhighway, PUBLIC UTILIES FORTNIGHTLY, June 15,
1994, at 31. For example, a significant portion of the services which have been provided to date in
the state of New York have benefitted business as opposed to residential users. Consumer Advo-
cates on Guard to Keep Telecom Bills Strong, State Telephone Regulation Report, May 5, 1994.
While some question the superhighway's utility to residential users, others are concerned that
residential users not be required to pay for services they don't use. See Testimony of Mark Cooper
Director of Research Consumer Federation of America, Before the Senate Commerce Telecom-
munications Improvement, FDCH Congressional Testimony, May 18, 1994. By comparison, the
general public has not yet generated needs sufficient to precipitate demands for greater network
speeds and capacities. Customer-users include residential as well as business customers.
1994]
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portunity to rest the justification for access and speech rights upon con-
stitutional grounds given the alleged absence of state action.6
Under such circumstances it is reasonable to ask: Will privatizing
the post-convergence, multi-functional, multi-media networks result in
speech rights only for network owners and those they elect to employ or
to serve under contract? Who will serve people who own no network?
In an era of privatized carriage in the provision of network services,
what ability will the government have to assure access and speech
rights for the non-facilities-based public?
This article defines private networks and closed user groups and
examines the current practices by which they limit the access and
6. Several scholars have criticized the current state/private dichotomy established by the
Supreme Court in light of the continuing trend toward privatization in American life. See Rodney
A. Smolla, The Bill of Rights At 200 Years: Bicentennial Perspective: Preserving the Bill of
Rights in the Modern Administrative-Industrial State, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 321, 358-359
(1990) (arguing that since restraints on human thought and action are the same whether applied
by public or private entities, protection of constitutional freedoms should be maintained in the
private as well as the public sector); Clyde W. Summers, The Privatization of Personal Freedoms
and Enrichment of Democracy: Some Lessons from Labor Law, U. ILL. L. REv. 689, 702 (1989)
(arguing that as more public functions are performed by private entities there is a critical need to
protect constitutional rights heretofore protected from government control in the public sphere
from private control in the private sphere).
Generally, absent a showing of an independent nexus of involvement by the state, however,
neither the chartering, funding, licensing, regulating or tax exemption of a corporation by the
government constitutes state action. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)
(regulation); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (licensing); Trageser v. Libbie
Rehabilitation Ctr., 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979) (funding);
Aasum v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 542 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1976); Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech-
nology, 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Weis v. Syracuse Uni-
versity, 552 F. Supp. 675, 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975) (N.D.N.Y. 1982); Naranjo v. Alverno
College, 487 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Manning v. Greensville Memorial Hosp., 470 F.
Supp. 662 (E.D. Va. 1979); Stewart v. New York Univ., 430 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); and
Sament v. Hahnemann Medical College and Hosp. of Phila., 413 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Pa. 1976),
aff'd mem., 547 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1977) (charter).
Where the private entity exercises powers traditionally reserved to the state, state action may
be found. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (municipal park); Marsh v. Alabama 326
U.S. 501 (1946) (company town); and Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (election).
Government regulation of broadcasting has not been deemed sufficient justification for finding
that the editorial decisions of broadcasters constitute state action. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). Decisions by regulated telephone companies to deny billing
services to information providers of government regulated indecent communication has not been
deemed to constitute state action. The weight of precedent would tend to support a conclusion that
activities of regulated entities such as cable operators and telephone companies which would be
constitutionally proscribed if conducted by the government are constitutionally permissible. Re-
cently, however, statutorily required efforts by cable operators to limit or ban indecent program-
ming on leased and/or public access channels have been deemed to constitute state action. See
infra note 106.
[Vol. 55:1085
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speech activities of potential and actual customers and subscribers as
well as employees on their networks. It then identifies and addresses
some of the potential constitutional questions raised by such practices.
The article concludes that current government efforts to rely on net-
work privatization to assure the development of network infrastructure
will continue. Even as this trend continues over time, however, the gov-
ernment retains ways in which it may act to ensure access and speech
rights for potential private network users, whether they are subscribers
or employees, while acknowledging the access and speech rights of net-
work providers.
The application and enforcement of libel, indecency and obscenity
laws can serve to encourage some network owners to relinquish edito-
rial control over content in order to avoid liability. This assumes that
the government relinquishes its strategy of imposing responsibility and
liability on both the network owner and the subscriber. Ultimately, ab-
sent the assertion of editorial control by the network provider, responsi-
bility and liability for speech should reside with the speaker.
Similarly, the removal of government-sanctioned limitations on
carrier tort liability would encourage network owners to eschew private
carriage for the protection that. public common carriage affords. Tort
liability under state law would attach whenever the private carrier neg-
ligently handles subscriber information. Private carrier and closed user
group attempts to exempt themselves from such liability via exculpa-
tory contract clauses or tariff language would be deemed unconsciona-
ble and unenforceable as a matter of law where it could be established
that the subscriber does not possess equal bargaining power. Only car-
riers providing service to the general public or substantial interconnec-
tion with public networks should enjoy the protection from tort liabil-
ity. Like the imposition of libel and criminal liability, the application of
tort liability would also serve as an incentive for private networks to
eschew control over content or, at the very least, provide access via
interconnection between other networks.
The government should continue a qualified reliance on the anti-
trust laws' and structural safeguards8 to assure access to network facil-
7. Information providers who find their access to network or their communication over the
network constrained by the network owner, may be able to establish that an antitrust violation has
occurred. If an information provider can successfully establish that the network provider either
possess and seeks to maintain monopoly power, or owns essential facilities or is attempting to
monopolize a market segment, the network provider's activity may be prohibited United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
Newspaper publishers, cable programmers and broadcasters which would comprise a signifi-
1994] 1091
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ities. In addition to the use of these strategies, the government may
cant portion of the potential information providers on a telecommunications carrier provided
broadband network, have alleged that the local telephone companies will in fact engage in anti-
competitive activities if they are allowed to vertically integrate into the market for providing infor-
mation services. For instance, broadcasters and cable operators oppose limited local telephone
company entry into video distribution services market via FCC's video dial tone proposal absent
significant safeguards. See generally Harry A. Jessell, Video Dial Tone Advances at FCC: Com-
missioners Propose to Establish Regulatory Framework for Telcos to Deliver TV Services,
BROADCASTING, Oct. 28, 1991, at 26; Cable Attacks VDT, Rural Exemption Extension, TELEVI-
SION DIG., Oct. 19, 1992, at 1. See also Charles Mason, Who Are the Real Monopolists? Telcos,
NCTA Trade Charges, TELEPHONY, Dec. 26, 1988, at 10; Elizabeth Sanger, Battle For The In-
formation Highway, Digital Dealing; Companies Seeking Fortunes in Tomorrow's Technology
Race to Join Forces, NEWSDAY, July 19, 1993, at 19; Quello's Concerns: Bell Atlantic Says
Telcos in Cable Will Improve Video Delivery Service, COMM. DAILY, Feb. 1, 1989, at 2. More-
over, anti-competitive activities of local telephone carriers have been cited as well. See Brian
Kaberline, Cable TV Ties Telecom Titans Into Fiber-Optic Knots, KANSAS CITY Bus. J., May 15,
1992, at 21; Edmund L. Andrews, 'Baby Bell' Fights Cable Law, Citing Right to Free Speech,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1992, § D; at 1; Edmund L. Andrews, Foes Are Softening Stands Against
Phone-TV Links, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1992, § 1, at 37; Paul Farhi, FCC Favors Phone Firms
Providing TV Service, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1991, at A12; Alan Pearce, Is Path Cleared for
RBOCs To Offer Into Services?, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 18, 1991, at 5.
Some parties allege that the Regulated Bell Holding Companies have been slow to implement
ONA because the RBOCs seek to minimize the possible economic advantage their competitors
might gain in providing information services before the telephone companies are allowed to com-
pete. Alan Pearce, Problems Continue to Postpone the Information Age, NETWORK WORLD, May
29, 1989, at 27.
Newspaper publishers opposed judicial removal of the prohibition to telco entry into the in-
formation services market by supporting introduction of legislation to restrict telco entry. See
Reaction to Court Decision; RHCs Assail Cooper Bill on MFJ as Anti-Competitive, COMM.
DAILY, Oct. 9, 1991, at 1. Efforts by legislators and the local telephone industry to have telco
entry into the video distribution market become the legislative fix for recent anti-competitive ac-
tivity by cable operators, were unsuccessful. See U.S. Congress Set to Re-Examine Ban on Cable-
Telephony Cross-Ownership, FINTEcH TELECOM MARKETS, Jan. 24, 1991, at 2.
Prior activity by cable operators, a group of vertically integrated network owner/information
providers, lends substantial credence to those concerns. See generally Quello's Concerns: Bell At-
lantic Says Telcos in Cable Will Improve Video Delivery Service, supra..
Most industry observers, scholars and commentators have suggested that some portion of the
future broadband network infrastructure may be composed of essential facilities. An antitrust
violation will arise where such facilities are: (1) extremely difficult if not impracticable for com-
petitors to duplicate; (2) owned by one or a group of firms; and (3) not made available to competi-
tors of the network facilities owner without an appropriate business justification or apparent effi-
ciency, especially where the network owner is also an information provider. See John M. Stevens,
Antitrust Law and Open Access to the NREN, 38 VILL. L. REV. 571, 575, 584-85. Aside from the
significant cost of litigation, the difficulty in establishing the relevant market at a time of fluctuat-
ing market boundaries is substantial.
8. In telecommunications, the term "structural safeguards" refers to the separation of a
vertically integrated firm into corporate segments based upon whether they provide basic network
services or enhanced services. The FCC defines enhanced services as services "which employ com-
puter processing applications that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspect of
the subscriber's transmitted information; provide the subscriber additional, different, or restruc-
[Vol. 55:1085
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pro-actively encourage access and speech by creating regulatory poli-
tured information; or involve subscriber interaction with stored information." 47 C.F.R.
§ 64.702(a) (1993). Enhanced services include data processing services as well as videotext, audi-
otext, database retrieval and other computer and communications technologies applications. See
Robert J. Butler, In the Aftermath of California v. FCC: Computer III Remand Proceedings
Pose Difficult Policy Choices For the Enhanced Services Industry, THE COMPUTER LAW., May
1991, at 24; Barbara D. Khait & Andrew S. Elston, RHCs and Information Services: Gateways
to Opportunity?, ONLINE, Sept. 1989, at 27.
The goal of open networks architecture policies, of which "structural separations" was a part,
is to prevent the ability of the RBOCs to underwrite their provision of competitive enhanced and
information services with monies garnered from their basic network monopoly. For an explanation
of the rationale for open network architecture and related policies see Memorandum Opinion and
Order In the Matter of Filing and Review of Open Network Architecture Plans, 8 FCC Rcd
2606; 1993 FCC LEXIS 1514; 72 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F), Mar. 29, 1993, at [*3]; and Dawn
Bushaus, Enhanced Services-ONA and AIN on Collision Course, CorIMM. WK., June 17, 1991, at
32L. See also FCC Plays Its ONA Cards, DATA COMM., Feb., 1991, at 50; Marshall Yates, The
Volatile World of Telecommunications, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 3, 1989, at 50.
In Computer III, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) the FCC reversed its previous requirement that
the RBOCs could provide enhanced services only through a structurally separate subsidiary corpo-
ration. See Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, recon., 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980), clarified on further
recon., 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981), affd sub nom., Computer and Communications Indus. Ass'n v.
FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983); BOC Separation Order,
95 F.C.C.2d 1117 (1983), affid sub nom. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 740 F.2d 465 (7th Cir.
1984), recon. denied, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,056 (1984), a.fl'd sub nom. North Am. Telecommunications
Ass'n v. FCC, 772 F.2d 1282 (7th Cir. 1985).
In adopting the Open Network Architecture Plans, the FCC determined that it would be
sufficient for the RBOCs to provide enhanced services as integrated entities and offer their "un-
bundled" basic network functions to other enhanced service providers on a tariffed, nondiscrimina-
tory basis. Computer, 104 F.C.C.2d at 964-65, 1063-66; Filing and Review of Open Network
Architecture Plans, 4 F.C.C.R. 1 (1988), recon., 5 F.C.C.R. 3084 (1990), amended plans condi-
tionally approved, 5 F.C.C.R. 3103 (1990). The FCC concluded that the requirement to unbundle
the network functions, combined with accounting and other non-structural safeguards would obvi-
ate the need to rely on the separate subsidiary requirement to prevent the RBOCs from engaging
in access discrimination and anticompetitive cross-subsidization which would favor their enhanced
service operations. Computer, 104 F.C.C.2d at 964, 1012, 2 F.C.C.R. 3035, 3039.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the FCC's Computer
III rulings. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990). Id. at 1238-39. The Ninth Circuit
held that the FCC had not provided sufficient support in the record for its conclusion that struc-
tural separation was no longer needed to prevent RBOC attempts at cross subsidization and that
accounting safeguards alone would be sufficient. The court concluded instead that the FCC's pro-
posed policy to allow the telephone companies into the enhanced services market on a vertically
integrated basis would increase the BOCs' incentives to engage in anti-competitive activity to
maintain or increase their market share for enhanced services. Id. at 1234. See also Public Ser-
vice Commission Paper Attacks Computer III Ruling, 5 WORLDWIDE VIDEOTEX TELE-SERVICE
NEWs (July 1993).
In the FCC's Computer III proceedings, subsequent to the court decision, the comments were
predictable. "The Bell regional holding companies (RHC) endorsed and enhanced service provid-
ers (ESP) opposed the FCC's attempts to slightly modify its accounting and non-discrimination
rules." See Boc Week, RHCS, Esps, States Form Familiar Lines In Computer III Remand, Mar.
18, 1991 Section: No. 11, vol. 8.
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cies and tax incentives that favor the building of open, switched, inter-
connected networks incorporating distributed intelligence. Such net-
works, whether public or private, could provide the opportunity for
large numbers of users to engage in broadband, multi-media interactive
speech.9 They also provide a preferable alternative to multi-channel,
uni-directional distribution systems in which network architecture and
functionality preclude two-way, broadband interactive communications
while facilitating the network owners' exercise of private editorial
control.
When combined with the regulatory strategies outlined above, se-
lection of a switched network architecture would also ensure that
neither network owners or users forfeit meaningful access or speech
rights. In a switched broadband interactive network environment, the
capacity for carriage of information is substantial, and thus the notion
of scarcity upon which the constitutional and regulatory policies con-
cerning antecedent technologies is based should become a less viable
justification for limiting access and speech rights.10
Subsequent to the court's decision, the FCC quickly reinstated its ONA requirements includ-
ing its waiver of the structural safeguards. It required that the RBOCs implement their plans to
offer unbundled services regardless of its ultimate decision on structural separation. See Computer
III Remand Proceedings, 5 F.C.C.R. 7719 (1990) and 6 F.C.C.R. 174 (1990). Pending the ulti-
mate decision, the RBOCs were allowed to continue offering enhanced services (previously ap-
proved by the FCC), as fully integrated companies.
The FCC's decision in the Remand Proceedings was not well received in some quarters. For
instance, in response to the FCC's decision, the District of Columbia Pubic Service Commission
took issue with the FCC's justifications for removing the separate subsidiary requirement. The
DCPSC argued that "it is clear that a separate subsidiary structure for the provision of new
(competitive) services by the RBOCs ("Regional Bell Operating Companies" or Telcos) does not
inhibit the introduction of new services, does not impede competition in certain markets and does
not cause consumer disruptions." See Public Service Commission Paper Attacks Computer III
Ruling, WORLDWIDE VIDEOTEX TELE-SERVICE NEws, July 1993.
At least one court was highly skeptical of the ONA plan's efficacy whether in its Computer II
form or its subsequent Computer III form. See United States v. Western Electric et al., 673 F.
Supp. 525 (1987), afl'd in part and rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 911 (1990). Ironically, the same mechanisms of the ONA plans which Judge Harold Greene
found so ineffective in 1987, are the very mechanisms the FCC proposes to implement under its
post California v. FCC, modified Computer III regulations.
9. There is significant uncertainty regarding how the public may ultimately react to and use
the broadband multi-media capabilities which may be provided by the electronic superhighway.
Nevertheless there is also substantial concern that, left to the vagaries of discernable short market
demand, industry will not provide an infrastructure capable of extending broadband, multi-media
interactive capabilities and services to most if not all network users.
10. Several arguments have arisen with regard to the viability of scarcity as a justification
for future regulation of communication and telecommunication media. Some argue that choice of
the appropriate technology can enhance opportunities for innovation and obviate the need for reg-
ulatory responses to access concerns raised by the existence of scarce transmission capacity.
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In the area of employee access and speech rights on employer net-
works, a pragmatic judicial or legislative balance must be struck be-
tween the network owners' legitimate business needs, employees' ac-
cess, speech and privacy rights, and public policy concerns including
the public's right to know. Ultimately, employee speech rights should
not turn on whether they are employed by public or private firms.
Rather, at minimum, employee speech rights should encompass con-
cerns regarding wages and working conditions, as well as safety and
product quality issues about which the public may have interest.11
II. NETWORKS AND CLOSED USER GROUPS DEFINED
A. General Characteristics
In their most basic manifestation, networks are collections of inter-
connected users. 2 Networks have numerous characteristics, including:
We need to develop an information network architecture that supports the "garage shop"
creative talents in terms of access to the network, and the best way to do this is opt for a
switched, rather than a channel, architecture. Switched systems, whereby information is
routed to a given address on demand, reduce the amount of bandwidth required to the
home-thus allowing copper wire to be perfectly adequate for the last 1,000 feet. Channel
architectures, in which all channels are fed to the set top decoder, require greater
bandwidth and will always result in channel scarcity.
See generally Rockley L. Miller, Digital World, MULTIMEDIA & VIDEODISC MONITOR, July 1993
(quoting Mitch Kapor, Chairman, Electronic Frontier Foundation).
For different reasons, one noted commentator argues that spectrum scarcity as well as the
current inability to build fiber to the home is a political rather than a technical or economic
problem due to poor regulatory policy choices. See George Gilder, TELECOSM; The New Rule
of Wireless, FORBES, Mar. 29, 1993, at 96.
One possible combination of the two above observations on scarcity is evident in the recent
observations of Professor Edwin Baker. He emphasizes what Kapor implies and Gilder states ex-
plicitly, that government choices regarding structural regulation can create transmission scarcity.
Baker goes on to note that the scarcity is then managed by use of other structural regulation
which seeks to manage the impact of the scarcity consistent with first amendment values. See C.
Edwin Baker, Merging Phone and Cable, Presented at the CITI Conference on Cable Television
and the First Amendment (Feb. 21, 1994) (citing C. EDWIN BAKER. HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREE-
DOM OF SPEECH (1989)).
11. See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, What Do Workers Want? Employee Interests, Public
Interests, and Freedom of Expression Under the National Labor Relations Act, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 921, 925, 935-36, 960-64 (1992) (arguing that the general public has an equal interest in the
product quality and safety concerns of public and private employees, and that public employees
have work place concerns similar to those of their private employee counterparts and ought to
enjoy the same protections for work place related expression and association).
12. For the purposes of the article, networks are defined as collections of interconnected
users. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION. NTIA INFRA-
STRUCTURE REPORT: TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION, at 13-20, 92 (1991).
The type of transmission and the receive/send machinery employed varies. These points may or
may not be capable of engaging in interactive communication. This definition acknowledges that
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(a) technology [spectrum, wire, fiber]; (b) information [video, voice,
data]; (c) ownership [private or public]; (d) control of content [editor,
hybrid, common carrier]; and (e) control of network access or function-
ality. This article discusses networks primarily in terms of ownership of
facilities, control of network access or functionality, and, ultimately,
control of content. In the process, it acknowledges the various charac-
teristics as they apply in addressing the impact of owner control on the
user subscriber and third parties.
B. The Network Lexicon
1. Public Switched Network: "Open Network"
The commercial common carrier network owners own the network
facilities and retain control of all levels of network functionality. 3
There are no predetermined limits on who may or may not join the
network. All who timely pay the subscription fee [e.g., tariff rate for
the particular class and volume of service] may gain access and enjoy
cable and broadcast television systems may be deemed to be networks just as the public switched
inter-exchange and local exchange systems constitute networks. This definition also facilitates the
exploration of the broader array of access solutions presently employed and likely to be employed
in the regulation of future networks.
The paper assumes that interconnection between networks or potential users of networks can
and does take place. It does not address directly the need for common languages, protocols and
conventions, speeds, as well as procedures of machine interaction, all of which are critical techni-
cal issues involved in network interconnection. For an excellent lay explanation of network inter-
connection and nomenclature, see Dertouzos, supra note 5, at 62; Vinton G. Cerf, Networks, Sci.
Am., Sept. 1991, at 72. These issues are addressed, if at all, solely from the perspective of the
network facilities, pricing and service configurations which the network owner(s) may choose in
providing services and the impact such choices may have on the potential user class. It is recog-
nized that choices made regarding network functions and features in significant measure can de-
termine the likely class of users. See note 5 supra. See also Thomas J. Duesterberg & Peter
Pitsch, Pot Hole Alert for the Information Superhighway; Communications: Requiring Universal
Access Would be Premature and a Drag on the Interactive TV Revolution, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 11,
1994, at B-7; Thomas A. Stewart & Patty de Llosa, Boom Time on the New Frontier, FORTUNE,
Sept. 27, 1993, at 153; Michael Botein, Toward an Information Superhighway/Let's Get Going
on a Data Highway. . .It Is Coming. But Don't Rush It, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 14, 1993, § 3, at 11.
Finally, the range of services that a network owner may provide are assumed to include, inter
alia, transmission, switching and routing, storage and/or manipulation of user information, access
to 3rd party and/or network provider information, and enhanced services. A network provider
need not provide all of the functions listed above, or be limited solely to those listed.
13. A network's functionality is the combination of the various hardware and software de-
fined functions the network performs. A network's functionality is determined by its hardware and
software architecture and by the network standards or documents which specify network proto-
cols. Network protocols allow hardware of various manufacture to communicate with one another.
See generally Peter Fetterolf, Connectivity: The Sum of Its Parts, BYTE, Nov. 1991, at 197.
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usage.14 The network is available to virtually all potential users,15 and
thus it may be defined as being "open."'" These networks are the long
distance, regional and local public switched networks.
2. Virtual Private Networks
In contrast to the public switched networks, virtual private net-
works (VPNs), offer their customers access to reserved private line ca-
pacity on the public switched telephone network (PSTN).17 VPN is es-
sentially a long-distance service in the United States. In the case of
VPNs, the user manages network applications while the carrier man-
ages all other levels of network functionality.' 8 It is anticipated that by
1997, VPN services will account for 17 per cent of the domestic service
revenues of the three biggest US long-distance carriers-AT&T, MCI
and Sprint.' 9
3. Private Networks
In the case of private networks, all telecommunications facilities
14. A tariff is a published set of rates charged and conditions under which various classes of
service are offered by common and private carriers.
15. The notion of network and service availability is subsumed within the definition of uni-
versal service. Universal Service was a government and industry policy that encouraged AT&T
(then a monopoly) to make telephones and service available to the American public at reasonable
rates. Subsidies of less profitable (or unprofitable) provision of service to rural and poorer areas
were built into the business and long distance charges. See David Coursey, Battle of the
Bandwidth, INFOWORLD, Jan. 14, 1991, at 34, 39. The traditional goal of universal service was to
assure that "all but the poorest Americans could afford to make and receive telephone calls, even
if they lived in remote, expensive to serve areas." Special Report: Universal Telephone Service;
Ready for the 21st Century?, supra note 3. As such, universal service operated as a kind of
equality in access and likeness in service offerings. In the current era of increased competition and
privatization, however, universal service may no longer mean likeness (or comparability) of service
or equality in technical access. Id.
16. The term "open," as used here to describe essentially, non-discriminatory access to com-
municate on the network as configured by the owner, should not be confused with the Federal
Communications Commission's "open network architecture" policy. In theory, the F.C.C.'s open
network architecture policy is an attempt to provide enhanced service providers such as voice
messaging, on line data and bulletin boards fair and non-discriminatory access to the local tele-
phone companies' transmission networks. See Dawn Bushaus, Enhanced Services-ONA and AIN
on a Collision Course, COMMUNICATIONSWEEK, June 17, 1991, at 32L, 6.
17. See generally Mark Luczak, Tapping the Hidden Savings in Virtual Networks; Hybrid
Networks, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Mar. 1991, at 45; Robert Violino, A Network of Their Very
Own, INFORMATIONWEEK, Jan. 14, 1991, at 16; and VPNs Set to Challenge Private Networks
and PSTN During Nineties, FINTECH TELECOM MARKETS, Apr. 15, 1992 at 31.
18. See generally supra note 13.
19. VPNs Set to Challenge Private Networks and PSTN During Nineties, supra note 17, at
19941
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are owned by an entity other than a government certified commercial
common carrier, or, the user leases dedicated lines from certified carri-
ers but maintains control over both ends of the communications chan-
nel. In the case of the latter, the user typically owns facilities on its
premises [local area networks or private branch exchanges-i.e., "in-
tra-building private networks"] and leases from carriers anything that
crosses public rights of way. For example, the company may lease a
dedicated T-1 between two privately owned private branch exchanges
(PBXs). Network usage is confined to the owner and its affiliates and is
not usually shared or aggregated on a commercial basis.2 0
4. Closed User Groups
A private network may be open or closed. Most closed user group
networks, however, are based on privately owned or dedicated facilities.
Thus, most closed user group networks are private.21 Closed user
groups are large volume users that tend to communicate with each
other "intensely." They combine to form alternative network associa-
tions for much of their communications needs. Associations' networks
may have specialized performance attributes related to group needs.22
20. The networks typically are created to meet the needs of their respective users for trans-
mission of high speed data, information processing, voice traffic or security. Consequently, they
serve closed sets of users with relatively cohesive sets of needs, as well as eligibility, procurement
and financing criteria. There are some firms which sell their excess network transmission capacity
commercially.
21. This definition does not include closed networks established without the use of private or
dedicated facilities.
22. Closed user group networks may be local, regional, national or international in scope.
Examples of closed user group networks include those owned by: ad agencies, media firms, print-
ers, insurance agencies, hospitals, record rooms, police, automobile manufacturers, parts suppliers,
dealers, financiers and computer networks. See generally James I. Cash, Jr. & Benn R. Konsyn-
ski, IS Redraws Competitive Boundaries, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar. 1985/Apr. 1985, p. 134; Venka-
traman, IT-Enabled Business Transformation: From Automation to Business Scope Redefinition,
SLOAN MGmT. REV., Jan. 1994, at 73N. See also John Helliwell, Networks Provide a Critical
Competitive Edge for Airlines: Reservation-System Leaders Reap Diverse Benefits, PC WEEK,
Jan. 19, 1988, at Cl and Salvatore Salamone, Airline Reservation Network Flies Into New Age of
LANS; Software Front End, QIK RES, Speeds Terminal Termination at American Airlines,
NETWORD WORLD, Nov. 26, 1990, at 34 (regarding airline closed user networks and usage) and,
More Shared Networks Approved Under § 4(c)(8), BANKING EXPANSION REP., Aug. 1, 1983, at
11 (regarding banking). See also Rita Marie Emmer, Chuck Tauck, Scott Wilkinson & Richard
G. Moore, Marketing Hotels Using Global Distribution Systems; Use of Electronic Listings and
Computers in the Hospitality Industry, 34 CORNELL HOTEL & RESTAURANT ADMIN. Q., 80 Dec.
1993, at 80 (regarding hotels).
For instance, the European Commission defines closed user groups as groups of companies
with "similar business interests," such as oil or airline firms. Such closed user groups may include
"business associates-wholly or partly-owned subsidiaries and suppliers of products and ser-
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5. Hybrid Networks
A large number of U.S. users have now opted for hybrid networks
combining leased lines between particular locations with VPNs. Users
prefer private networks for sensitive business information (in the form
of encrypted data) because these are considered more secure and, on
occasion, cheaper than VPNs.
6. Other Networks Distinguished
The preceding definitions are admittedly limited to switched tele-
communications networks that are in some way related to the public
switched networks. In contrast, video distribution networks include
traditional broadcasting and cable television networks, which are non-
switched, essentially one way distribution media that are not usually
interactive.
C. Convergence and Metamorphosis: From Cable and Telephony to
Broadband Networks
It is argued that cable networks and local telephone networks
likely will evolve into the switched broadband interactive networks of
the near future.23 Should this be true, the resulting networks could
span the gamut from private networks, to public (common carrier) net-
works, and they could incorporate a potential range of access options
from non-discriminatory access,24 to private access by negotiated con-
tract or ownership. Speech options could range from owner control of a
portion of available capacity with unrestricted user speech on the re-
vices-as well as customers." See Shortlist of Five for European Super-Network, FINTECH
TELECOM MARKETS, Dec. 9, 1993; Viatel Goes Cross-Border with Europe's First Voice Network,
FINTECH TELECOM MARKETS, Nov. 25, 1993 (discussing the impact of the European Commis-
sion's decision to define closed user groups). User groups' networks may be closed for numerous
reasons including: specialized equipment, specialized features, transmission speeds, security, ser-
vice pricing or speech related restrictions.
23. See supra note 1, at 42; Deutschman, supra note 1, at 21-22; Sugawara, supra note 1,
at Al, AS. For an explanation of some of the strategic market and technical reasons for the
merger of telephone and cable networks, see S. Ronald Foster, CATV Systems are Evolving to
Support A Wide Range of Services, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Jan. 1994, at 95; Dave Schriftgiesser,
Key Trends in Broadband Communications: The Next Five-Years, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Jan.
1994, at 101; Rick Pinkham, Combining Apples and Oranges; Part 1; Telecommunications and
CATV Companies Merge to Form Full Service Hybrid Networks, TELEPHONY, Jan. 24, 1994, at
32; Alan Stewart, Classless Cables; Common Networks for Televisions and Telephones, COMM.
INT'L, Oct. 1993, at 8.
24. Non-discriminatory access in the common carrier context connotes holding out one's self
to provide like services to like situated customers at equitable rates.
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maining portion, to owner control of all capacity and ultimately all
speech allowed on the network. This spectrum of alternative access and
speech relationships is in essence the amalgam of access and speech
relationships currently residing on cable (mandated leased or free ac-
cess) and telecommunications (non-discriminatory and negotiated con-
tract access) networks.
In this context, litigation challenging the must carry rules of the
Cable Competition and Consumer Protection Act of 1992 and the
telco-cable cross-ownership prohibition of the Cable Communication
Policy Act of 1984, as well as several E-mail and electronic bulletin
board service cases currently percolating through the judicial system,
may establish much of the scope of access and speech rights network
owner providers and users will have. 5
III. THE CURRENT SCOPE OF NETWORK AND USER GROUP ACCESS
AND SPEECH RESTRICTIONS
There are at least four levels at which a network owner or closed
user group may control access or speech activities on their facilities.
Control may be exercised over actual speech or communication (con-
tent), over access to the network as configured by the owner (network
access), over the ability to reconfigure network functionality (network
software intelligence), and over the ability to set equipment standards
for network provisioning and interfacing with the network (equipment
standards and network protocols). Current government policies affect
the exercise of access and speech at each of the first three levels.
Legal sanction of the exercise of control varies depending upon the
manner in which the network is used. Where the network is merely one
of many tools or assets used by a firm to conduct its business, the "net-
work owner" enjoys wide latitude over each of the four levels. Where
the network and its related functions and services are the product that
the private or public firm sells to customers, the network owner's ability
to control access and speech has been subject to greater government
restraint, depending on architecture, market power and traditional
rights accorded networks having similar technologies and functions.
25. See infra Parts IIB and III.
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A. Owner-Imposed Limitations on Access-Subscriber/User Initiated
Access to Third Party Users and Networks
1. Network Owner/Employer Restrictions on Outgoing Calls
Employers may be subscribers to the public switched networks,
virtual private network subscribers, owners of their own networks or a
collection or association of users forming a closed user group. They
may be private or public firms. In any event, because of the utility of
long distance and electronic mail (E-mail), as well as the growth in
availability of 800 and 900 services, employers often find it necessary to
block access to certain networks and phone services in order to limit
corporate expenses. Call blocking, for instance, is used to limit em-
ployee access to the above-mentioned services. 26 In the process, employ-
ees are denied access to the networks over which such services are pro-
vided and the information providers residing at the other end of the
line. Federal and municipal government call blocking restrictions on ac-
cess to dial-a-porn and long distance calls are well-known examples.
Employers also engage in call monitoring as a means of policing their
restrictions on network usage.2 s
Employers' justifications for engaging in these practices include
the need to manage or reduce costs or fraud involved in unauthorized
900 number and E-mail calls. In addition, some companies use com-
puters to monitor customer service employees' performance, such as
keystrokes per minute, time between phone calls, length of breaks, and
number of errors.29
There are potential dangers inherent in call blocking and monitor-
ing that raise significant public policy issues. Call blocking has been
argued to implicate First Amendment concerns because the employer's
limitations on access to the network constitute limitations on potential
speech activities in which the employee might otherwise engage. Call
monitoring is said to raise issues of worker privacy as the employee's
26. See Carl Warren, Abuse of Company Facilities for E-mail Must be Curbed, NETWORK
WORLD, Mar. 30, 1992, at 25.
27. For instance, many New York City agencies have configured their phones to prevent
city workers from dialing long distance and calling specialty phone services such as dial-a-porn
and sports information lines. See Jennifer Preston, It's OK As Long as It's A Local Call, NEws-
DAY, Oct. 26, 1989, at 5.
28. See, e.g., Ronald E. Roel, Advances in The Campaign For Workers' Rights: Laws,
Court Rulings Offer Protection In Areas Where Bill of Rights Doesn't, NEWSDAY, Jan. 10, 1988,
at 84. See also Plan to Monitor Calls Made by Civil Servants Attacked, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10,
1985, at 11.
29. Roel, supra note 28, at 84.
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expectation of privacy is infringed by periodic monitoring.30 Call block-
ing and monitoring activities raise nettlesome problems for the public's
"right to know" as well, these practices may also be used to detect
whistle blowers instead of individuals calling dial-a-porn providers and
other unauthorized users.3 '
Some observers argue that employer/network owner control of ac-
cess or usage of the corporate telephone or network affects employee's
constitutional speech and privacy rights.32 Such arguments have met
with only limited success to date. The speech activities upon which the
articulation of "new" employee rights are based nevertheless occur
within the traditional confines of the work place, conducted over tech-
nologies that are owned or paid for by the employer. Even though E-
mail and intelligent network technologies provide new opportunities for
speech activities, the articulation of these activities as rights squarely
pits them against the established and legally recognized property rights
of the employer/network owner.
2. Third Party Access to Private Network or VPN Facilities
Firms also attempt to limit third party access to their networks to
protect against toll fraud.3 3 Computerized telephone equipment such as
voice mail often help companies conduct business with greater effi-
ciency and lower cost. They also often provide access to electronic
thieves, however, who steal thousands of dollars of long-distance tele-
phone service. Unauthorized entry can be accomplished by calling a
company's toll-free 800 number or a voice mailbox and using a com-
puter with an automatic dialer to break the security code and gain ac-
30. Id. at 84. An examination of employee privacy rights is beyond the scope of this article.
31. See Plan to Monitor Calls Made by Civil Servants Attacked, supra note 28, at 1. "The
limited rights granted to government workers under the under the United States Constitution have
been strongly reinforced for federal workers through the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989."
Tom Devine, A Whisteblower's Checklist, CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, Nov. 1991, at 207, 212. The
laws protecting corporate employees, are inconsistent at the state level. Id.
32. Carol Wolinsky & James Sylvester, Privacy in the Telecommunications Age, Feb. 1992,
at 23, 24.
33. See Susan E. Kinsman, Toll Fraud on Rise, SNET Says, THE HARTFORD COURANT,
July 29, 1992, at BL. "To frustrate casual hackers, net managers are adding password protection
to private branch exchanges, voice mail systems, automated attendants and the remote adminis-
trative ports used to manage them. They are thwarting the pros by blocking calls to certain loca-
tions and taking corrective action when call monitoring indicates they've fallen victim to hackers."
See Annabel Dodd, When Going the Extra Mile is Not Enough, NETWORK WORLD, Apr. 12,
1993, at 49.
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cess to the company's telephone system and outgoing lines.34 Electronic
bulletin boards are sometimes used to exchange generic passwords that
provide access to company maintenance ports, exchange programming
instructions for various systems, or procure programming manuals for
voice systems. As a result, unauthorized parties can gain operational
control, including the ability to unblock restrictions on international di-
aling and turn off on-site call accounting equipment.35 According to
some experts, computer hacking may cost U.S. companies between $2.2
billion and $4 billion each year.36
In a less arcane realm, E-mail, voice-mail and telephony systems
may be used by union organizers, law enforcement authorities, friends
or family members to communicate with employees. Efforts of union
organizers to make use of the employer-owned telecommunications sys-
tems or networks to communicate with employees under section 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),37 may prove unsuccessful.
As a practical matter, recent precedent supports the employer's right to
bar union access absent a showing that the union possesses no other
reasonable means of communicating its organizational message to
employees. 38
34. Kinsman, supra note 33, at B1.
35. Dodd, supra note 33, at 49.
36. Kinsman, supra note 33, at BI.
37. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
38. For instance, absent a showing by union organizers that: (I) they possess no other rea-
sonable alternative means of communication to reach non-union employees, or (2) that the em-
ployer is discriminating against the union by denying access to facilities the employer otherwise
makes available, the courts are unlikely to afford the organizers access to an employer's private e-
mail or telecommunications facilities. See Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 848 (1992),
quoting and affirming NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956). Given the
circumstances cited by the Lechmere court as justifying a conclusion that no other reasonable
access to communication existed, [logging and mining camps or remote resort hotels], Lechmere
at 849, one commenter has concluded that organizers must establish "employee isolation" in order
to prove the absence of reasonable alternative means of communication. Michael L. Stevens, The
Conflict Between Union Access and Private Property Rights: Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB and the
Question of Accommodation, 41 EMORY L.J. 1317, 1335 (1992).
Newspaper advertisements were explicitly rejected as a "RAMC" by the Lechmere Court.
The NLRB has held that media advertisements are not considered a RAMC due to their costly,
impersonal nature and absent access to the phone numbers of target employees, telephones do not
constitute a reasonable alternative. See generally Peter J. Ford, The NLRB, Jean Country, and
Access to Private Property: A Reasonable Alternative to Reasonable Alternative Means of Com-
munication Under Fairmont Hotel, 13 GEo. MASON U. L. REv. 683 (1991) (arguing that the Jean
Country decision strikes a more appropriate balance between employer property rights and em-
ployee access to information under section 7 of the NLRA, and citing all NLRB access cases
through the 1991 publication date of the article and their holdings).
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3. Restriction on Membership in Closed User Groups: Control of
the Jointly Owned Network Asset
Some firms joint venture to develop inter-organizational network
systems (IONSs). IONSs can increase the efficiency and competitive-
ness of their owners.39 In the process, IONSs also can serve as a cata-
lyst to realign the relative market position of non-owners by creating
new barriers to market entry and exit that are often controlled by the
IONS owners.40 By establishing, maintaining, and changing its pricing
structure as well as network applications, standards, protocols, and in-
39. Cash & Konsynski, supra note 22.
There are three levels at which companies can participate in an IONS: information entry and
receipt (content), software development and maintenance (network intelligence), and network
(network as configured) and processing management.
At the first level, the IOS participant performs no application processing and merely acts
as an information entry-receipt node. The user generally has access only through restricted
protocols. The IOS simply provides standard messages, as, for example, when an indepen-
dent travel agency uses one of the major airline reservation systems with no additional in-
house processing capability. The majority of current IOS participants are operating at this
entry level ...
Although level 1 participation is not complex, the relationships established with other
organizations over time can help restructure the industrial marketplace in which the par-
ticipant operates. For example, IOS brokerage networks have permitted savings and loan
(S&L) organizations to offer discount brokerage services. In the larger S&Ls, this innova-
tion has given rise to a new customer segment, and the resulting increased transaction
volume has forced improvements in the software and communications systems.
This improvement in turn has had the effect of bringing about economies of scale,
driving unit costs down, and introducing other products and services (such as
insurance) ...
Companies participating at level 2 develop and maintain software used by other IOS
participants. Usually, the developer of the IOS has absorbed the cost of this development
and maintenance to gain exclusive control over decisions on access, price, and design of the
application and the network. In the airline reservation system examples already mentioned,
American and United Airlines are level 2 participants. They are primarily responsible for
developing their SABRE and APOLLO systems, respectively ...
The level 3 participant serves as a utility and usually owns or manages all the network
facilities as well as the computer processing resources. Examples include public information
networks such as the Bell operating companies, The Source, and CompuServe. Costs in-
crease dramatically at this level.
In addition to network development and maintenance costs, the level 3 participant accepts
considerable internal control responsibility for the integrity of information exchanged. For exam-
ple, consider the CIRRUS network that permits ATM transactions nationwide. CIRRUS must
accept a great deal of responsibility for the reliability, availability, integrity, security, and privacy
of its system." Id. at 140-41.
40. Cash & Konsynski, supra note 22.
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ternal control procedures,41 IONSs owners can raise barriers to system
(and often, market) access for competitors.42
B. Network Owners' Exercise of Content Controls
Public and private firms also use call monitoring to manage em-
ployee communications to the firm's customers. Telemarketing and
travel reservations services are two common examples.43 There are also
numerous content/subject matter restrictions. For instance, some com-
puter networks have asserted control over bulletin board content in re-
sponse to various user protests regarding speech on controversial
subjects.44
Aside from firm business-oriented restrictions on access and in-
house, on-line speech, there are the traditional and evolving limits on
41. This is an area that is receiving increasing scrutiny as network users push for access to
the network's functionalities and intelligence for purposes of reconfiguration.
42. For instance, it is alleged that owners of major airline reservation systems have acted in
anti-competitive ways by using their systems to minimize the bookings of competing non-owners.
See Dunstan McNichol, Former NWA Exec Says Computer Monopoly Is Killing Airlines,
STATES NEws SERVICE. See also Helliwell, supra note 22. While the actual use and impact of the
networks is still debated, it is clear that in the airline, travel, hotel and vacation/leisure businesses,
the use of inter-organizational networks has often lead to a significant competitive edge in the
market. See Salamone, supra note 22.
43. See Wolinsky & Sylvester, supra note 32, at 25.
44. Prodigy Services Co., an information services company owned jointly by Sears, Roebuck
and Co. and International Business Machines Corp., has been involved in a number of controver-
sies regarding speech over it facilities. It elected to eliminate a bulletin board file entitled "Health
Spa" when its frank discussion of gay sexual practices spawned a bitter feud between religious
fundamentalists and gays. It has terminated the memberships of subscribers protesting Prodigy's
increase in E-mail prices to Prodigy advertisers.
Moreover, while Prodigy maintains that its subscribers have no First Amendment rights on
its bulletin board services, it nevertheless does not want to be held responsible for the content of
communications it allows to run absent an express endorsement or failure to disavow. For in-
stance, Prodigy was uncomfortable with taking responsibility for bulletin board statements that
the Holocaust never occurred. See W. John Moore, Taming Cyberspace, 24 NAT'L J. 745, Mar.
28, 1992.
Some other bulletin board providers have no policy regarding what may or may not be said
over their facilities. For them, the communicator of the information bears the ultimate responsibil-
ity for the content. Their position has met with judicial approval in one instance. See Cubby, Inc.
v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The Cubby court held that CompuServe
was not responsible for allegedly libelous statements made in a bulletin board called Rumormon-
ger that was carried on CompuServe's system. Id. at 142. Liability was not forthcoming because
CompuServe did not exercise editorial confrol over the bulletin board's content. Id. See also
Moore, supra at 28, 29. Felicity Barringer, Electronic Bulletin Boards Need Editing. No They
Don't, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1990, § 4, at 4.
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access and speech in the realm of broadcasting, 45 cable television46 and
traditional telephone service.?
Long distance and local network providers are viewed by at least
one Supreme Court Justice and the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts
as private speakers possessing the right to refuse carriage or billing ser-
vices to subscribers seeking carriage of programming the carrier deems
undesirable.48 By comparison, the D.C. Circuit has not agreed with the
45. The Courts have held that the First Amendment protects the exercise of speech and
editorial control over programming decisions and transmissions by broadcast licensees. Syracuse
Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1019 (1990).
46. Cable television operators enjoy significant protection as well. The First Amendment
protects the exercise of speech and editorial discretion by cable television operators. Leathers v.
Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991); City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476
U.S. 484, 494 (1986). However, the courts have not definitively decided whether cable operators
possess absolute editorial and speech rights. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
U.S.L.W., at A-798 (May 5, 1993) (request for injunction against enforcement of must carry
section of Cable Act of 1992 legislation denied).
47. Similarly to cable television, the First Amendment has been held to protect voice com-
munications over telephone. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
Recently, the First Amendment has been held to accord local exchange network operators the
right to engage video communication to their service area subscribers. Chesapeake and Potomac
Tel. of Va. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993). See also The Cable Communica-
tions Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1984) (prohibiting local telephone companies from
providing video programming to potential viewers in their service area directly or indirectly
through an entity owned by the telephone company or under its common control); Edmund L.
Andrews, Ruling Frees Phone Concerns to Offer Cable Programming, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 25, 1993,
at Al (announcing the U.S. District Court decision overturning the telephone-cable television
cross-ownership ban).
48. 492 U.S. at 131 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Dial Info. Servs. Corp. of N.Y. v.
Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535, 1540 (2d Cir. 1991); Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 1987); and Information Providers' Coalition
for the Defense of the First Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 870 (9th Cir. 1991) (Information
Providers).
In each of the cases the issues concerned messages for which the telephone companies col-
lected fees on behalf of the information provider. The information providers were allowed to pro-
vide messages which the telephone companies did not provide billing services for. Nevertheless, the
difficulties associated with collections absent the assistance of the phone companies rendered the
information providers' businesses marginal at best. The carriers' provision of billing services was
voluntary rather than required by law.
In Information Providers, the Court, inter alia, considered petitioners' assertion that FCC
regulations requiring the individual wishing to receive "dial-a-porn" messages notify the carrier in
writing, constituted a prior restraint. The Court concluded that no prior restraint was involved
because there was no government action to enjoin speech, require advanced governmental approval
for speech, censor or license speech. Instead, the court found that only the telephone companies
are involved. Furthermore, as they are private actors, they are constitutionally free to ban dial-a-
porn from their networks or refuse to make available billing services to dial-a-porn information
providers. 928 F.2d at 877. Similar conclusions were reached in Carlin, 827 F.2d at 1293, 1295,
1297 n.10, and in Dial Info., 938 F.2d at 1543.
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Second and Ninth Circuits' private actor analysis (applied by the Sec-
ond and Ninth Circuits in the context of telephony). In Alliance for
Media v. FCC, it declined to view the cable operator as a private actor
in the context of regulating indecency on access channels on cable tele-
vision.4 9 The D.C. Circuit distinguished the telephone and cable con-
texts noting that unlike the government-compelled offering of leased
and public access channels in cable, the billing services provided by
telephone companies were voluntary and therefore private.50
The state action/private action distinction relied upon by the D.C.
Circuit in Alliance, could have a profound effect on future regulation
49. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated, 1994
U.S. App. Lexis 6440. In Alliance, the Court considered among other issues, the constitutionality
of FCC regulations requiring in some situations that cable operators: (1) prohibit or segregate any
programming on their leased access channels which they reasonably believes to be indecent; and
(2) prohibit obscene or indecent programming as well as programming soliciting unlawful con-
duct. In response to the government's argument that cable operators operating under the regula-
tions are not state actors, the court concluded that the statute significantly encourages the opera-
tors to ban indecent speech. Consequently, operator action is state action. Id. at 818-20.
The Circuit Court reached its conclusion upon applying the state action test set forth in
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) to Section 10 of the Cable Competition and Consumer
Protection Act of 1992. Id. at 818-22. Per Reitman, the immediate objective, historical context
and ultimate effect of the cable statute were examined. The Circuit Court found that: (a) the
statute's immediate objective was to suppress indecent information by limiting its transmission via
access channels; (b) the context of the statute evidenced an effort by the government to strip cable
operators of editorial power over the content of information on leased and public access channels
and then enlist the cable operator in identifying and then prohibiting only indecent material; and
(c) the ultimate effect of the statute was to encourage a number of cable operators to ban indecent
programming from leased and access channels altogether. Id. Based on these findings, the Circuit
Court concluded that the statute's encouragement of total denial of indecent speech by cable
operators constituted state action. Id. at 822.
The court went on to find the total ban unconstitutional because it was not the least restric-
tive means for achieving the government's goal of regulating access to indecent programming by
children. Id. at 823-24.
50. Id. at 821 and accompanying notes. Absent the voluntary billing services distinction, it
can be argued that there is no reasonable distinction between the telephone and cable contexts as
addressed by the courts. Access to cable is mandated by statute while access to foreborne tele-
phone carriers is ostensibly by election of the carrier and access to non foreborne carriers is based
on state and federal regulation of tariff offerings. Given the longstanding state and federal regula-
tory policies regarding universal access, however, non-discriminatory service for like customers
ordering like service, and carrier content neutrality, aside from the universal access requirement in
telephony, an explanation of the Ninth and District of Columbia Circuit decisions based on the
above referenced distinction between cable and telephony is questionable. Regardless of Congress'
disinclination to label cable a common carrier, even with reference to access channels, given the
first come first served non-discriminatory operation of access channels, it is difficult to make a
reasonable distinctions between cable access channels and basic telephone service under tariff ab-
sent the "voluntary billing" distinction.
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of customer access to the networks of forborne carriers.51 They, like the
local telephone companies' offering of billing services, offer their com-
mon carrier communications services on a voluntary basis. Thus, ac-
cording to the Alliance analysis, they would be free to engage in dis-
criminatory provision of services 2
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION
The above admittedly cursory review leads to the conclusion that
network owner/providers limit access and speech activities of employ-
ees, user/members and third parties to accomplish numerous tasks, in-
cluding: protection of property, assets, costs and market share, as well
as to achieve competitive advantage, limit or constrain dissemination of
proprietary information, manage the communication of information, or
discourage the procurement of sometimes illicit information.
Under such circumstances when may we say that a user-member
or a potential outside communicator is impermissibly constrained from
gaining access or engaging in speech? Is it possible to distinguish be-
tween legitimate business needs and impermissible constraints on
speech activities? At first blush, based on the prior discussion, one
could suggest that permissible firm needs include all of those previously
listed above.53 By the same token, others might argue that impermissi-
ble firm needs include many of the same goals articulated as
legitimate.54
51. See In the Matter of Tariff Filing Requirements for Nondominant Common Carriers, 8
F.C.C.R. 6752 (1993); In the Matter of Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carri-
ers, 4 F.C.C.R. 2873 (1989); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. F.C.C., 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
52. Under a narrow reading of the applicable precedent, they arguably would be constitu-
tionally free to ban dial-a-porn from their networks by refusing to offer billing services to dial-a-
porn information providers. For the D.C. Circuit Court's analysis of Dial Info., Carlin Communi-
cations and Information Providers, see Alliance, 10 F.3d at 820-21 (1993).
53. While the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 protects
users of E-Mail and bulletin boards against the intentional monitoring of their messages by third
parties, employers seeking to protect company information and assets can monitor employee
messages on internal E-mail systems. Julie Bennett, Firms' Rights Protected by Electronic Mail
Laws, CRAIN'S NEW YORK BUSINESS, Oct. 8, 1990, at 28. The Electronic Communications Pri-
vacy Act of 1986 also allows employers to read employee E-mail messages situated on company
computer systems that permit third party access, provided the employee gives permission. Rosa-
lind Resnick, The Outer Limits, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 16, 1991, at 1, 6.
54. Some commentators take the position that any monitoring of E-Mail or searching
through personal employee files is ethically wrong regardless of the law. See Glenn Rifkin, Do
Employees Have a Right to Electronic Privacy?, N.Y. Tims, Dec. 8, 1991, at 8. Aside from
questions of ethics, other commenters have argued that the use of monitoring is demoralizing to
employees and therefore counter productive. Glenn Rifkin, The Ethics Gap, COMPUTERWORLD,
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One possible way to answer this dilemma is to examine the man-
ner in which the law has addressed and apportioned access and speech
rights in the varying relationships between network owner/providers
and closed user groups, on the one hand, and network users and third
parties on the other. A critical distinction in the manner in which such
rights are apportioned is the relative status of the network. Where the
network is an asset established primarily for the internal use of the
corporation or closed user group, the employees, closed user members,
and third party communicators have very limited a6cess and speech
rights. Where the network is the product or service offered by the cor-
poration or closed user group, subscribers and viewers have been ac-
corded greater access and speech rights based on constitutional, eco-
nomic and other public policy principles.
A. Network as Business Asset or Tool
1. Employer/Employee Relationships
As mentioned above, employers may be network owner/providers,
closed user groups, or simply network subscribers. The nature of their
status as public or private institutions, however, has a significant effect
on the scope of expectations that an employee may have regarding con-
stitutional protection of their arguable rights of access to company fa-
cilities and ability to speak on those facilities.
Recently, there has been a spate of law suits filed by employees
alleging that their constitutional rights have been violated when em-
ployers monitored their conversations over E-mail or telephone net-
works. 55 None of the suits appear to have been judicially resolved to
date,"8 but there are some indications of the extent of protection af-
forded employee speech. For instance, most experts agree that while
the Federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 protects
the privacy of electronic messages sent through public networks to
which individuals or companies subscribe, it does not apply to internal
E-mail.57 Thus, to the extent that employees enjoy speech rights on
Oct. 14, 1991, at 83, 85.
55. See Bennett, supra note 53, at 28; Alice Kahn, Careful-The Boss Might be Reading
Your Electronic Mail, STAR TRIB., Nov. 20, 1991, at 3E; More E-Mail Legal Actions, COMPUTER
FRAUD & SECURITY BULL., Feb. 1992, at 21, 22; Resnick, supra note 53, at 1; Rifkin, supra note
54, at 8; Linda Wilson, Addressing E-mail Rights, INFORMATIONWEEK, Feb. 15, 1993, at 54.
56. See Victoria Slind-Flor, What is E-Mail Exactly?, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 25, 1991, at 3, 33.
57. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) protects all electronic communi-
cations systems, including purely internal E-mail systems and public systems from outside intrud-
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company E-mail facilities, those rights are limited to communication
over public E-mail systems. Employers retain the right to restrict ac-
cess to, and monitor E-mail transmitted over private lines.
a. Public Employer/Employee
The courts have held that a public employee has First Amendment
constitutional protection for speech about "matters" of public con-
cern.5 8 In cases where the employee is acting as a "whistle blower,"
public policy and legislation in an increasing number of jurisdictions
support a public employee's right to speak.59 It is clear, however, that
employees do not enjoy an unfettered right of speech. For instance, cur-
rent cases allow the employer to deny such speech where it may disrupt
the work place.60
b. Private Employer/Employee
Under the National Labor Relations Act, an employee has statu-
tory protection for speech concerning work-related activities. 61 There
ers. It also protects the privacy of certain messages sent over public electronic mail systems like
Compuserve and MCI Mail in much the same manner as telephone calls over public telephone
systems are protected. See Electronic Media Regulation and the First Amendment: Future Per-
spective, supra note 3, at 5. See generally Wilson, supra note 55, at 54; Rifkin, supra note 54, at
83.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986, for example, states that elec-
tronic mail messages on company computer systems that also permit access from outside can be
read by the employer-but only if the receiver or sender gives permission. See Resnick, supra note
53, at 6.
Also, to the extent that state constitutions afford an employee a right of privacy or speech,
they may not be precluded by the ECPA. For instance, a recent attempt to argue federal preemp-
tion failed in California. See Victoria Slind-Flor, supra note 56, at 34.
58. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 391 (1987) (public employees may not be fired for
making statements about matters of public concern unless employer's interest is great). See gener-
ally Estlund, supra note 11, at 923-24. Nevertheless, the question of whether employees can make
such statements over the company's E-mail and/or telephone systems has not been addressed to
date.
59. See Estlund, supra note 11, at 923 n.8. See also MATTHEW W. FINKIN ET AL., LEGAL
PROTECTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE 284-86 (1989).
60. Whether a public employee's speech concerns a matter of public interest is determined
by the content, form and context of the statement, gleaned from the entire record before the court.
See Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-148 (1983). See also Cynthia K.Y. Lee, Comment,
Freedom of Speech in the Public Workplace: A Comment on the Public Requirement, 76 CAL. L.
REv. 1109, 1111 (1988). Even when a public employee's speech addresses a matter of public
concern, an employer can restrict the speech in question if the employer perceives that the speech
will disrupt the workplace. Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the
Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 3, 4 (1987).
61. These include section 7 concerted activities for the purposes of mutual aid, such as
[Vol. 55:1085
HeinOnline  -- 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1110 1993-1994
PRIVATE NETWORKS, PUBLIC SPEECH
are also "whistle blower" statutes in many states which protect em-
ployee speech about company wrongdoing.62 Otherwise, under the
"work at will" doctrine, the employee ostensibly has no recognized
speech rights in the face of legitimate company interests, aside from
unionization-related issues.6" The scope of an employee's statutory li-
cense to use company E-mail or telecommunications facilities to realize
their work-related speech right, however, is not established."
2. Closed User Group and Members (Actual and Potential)
Where firms or users associate via network facilities that they have
acquired, they may exercise control over member and non member net-
work access and speech.65
While the scope of a closed user groups (private network's) liabil-
ity for actionable speech is unsettled, it seems intuitively appropriate
that its liability track that of bulletin board system operators.66 The
union organizing, and striking to improve working conditions. They arguably also include protests
and advocacy which predate cognizable collective efforts to organize. See Estlund, supra note 11,
at 923 n.8; Charles Morris, NLRB Protection in the Nonunion Workplace: A Glimpse at a Gen-
eral Theory of Section 7 Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1677 (1989).
62. See Estlund, supra note 11, at 923 n.8. See also FINKIN ET AL., supra note 59, at 284-
86.
63. One expert has argued that despite the fact that free speech is a constitutional right
outside of the workplace, speech can be regulated in the workplace so long as there are legitimate
business reasons for doing so. Also, there should be a clear corporate policy enunciated which sets
forth the reasons for the restrictions. See Electronic Mail Raises Issues About Privacy, Experts
Say, BNA DAILY LABOR REPORT, Nov. 17, 1992, Current Developments Section.
The arguable absence of legally sanctioned speech rights has not deterred those who view
employee speech as a right. See Rifkin, supra note 54, at 83, 85.
To date, businesses have not authored many guidelines for internal corporate E-mail net-
works. There are, however, as many as 200 state statutes covering E-mail related issues. See
Electronic Mail Raises Issues About Privacy, Experts Say, BNA DAILY LABOR REPORT, Nov.
17, 1992 Current developments Section.
64. Similarly, at least one scholar argues that employers are free to invade employee pri-
vacy on E-mail as well. Steven B. Winters, Do Not Fold, Spindle or Mutilate: An Examination of
Workplace Privacy in Electronic Mail, 1 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 85 (1992).
65. Other forms of control are used as well. For instance, on the internet, an amalgam of
research oriented networks moving towards commercialization, group users sometimes "gang up
on abuses [by a particular user] in a form of citizens' arrests [sic] in which abusers are asked to
stop disrespectful behavior." J.A. Savage & Gary H. Anthes, Internet Privatization Adrift, COM-
PUTERWORLD, Nov. 26, 1990, at 1. According to the Chair of the Internet Activities board, this
form of censure has been effective and no one has been forced off the network. Id. Efforts to police
university run systems are less benign and sometimes less successful. W. John Moore, supra note
44, at 745.
66. While it is possible that a sysop may be held responsible for libelous information resid-
ing on its bulletin board systems, the current law is unsettled as to the scope of such liability or
the circumstances under which such liability would attach. See Robert Charles, Note, Computer
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more extensive its control over the communication of content, the more
extensive the liability ought to be for that content. At the same time,
the more extensive the control of content, the less extensive individual
user speech rights, will be on that network.
B. Network as Product or Service: Relationships between Network
Owner/Providers and Users
1. Network Owner/Provider and Subscriber/Users (Common
Carriage)
The largest category of relationships between network owners and
consumers exists in the provision of network transmission capacity and
network related services. Telecommunications network owners may
provide transmission between two or more points at varying speeds with
a variety of ways to manipulate the various types of transported infor-
mation. Services range from the provision of transmission capability for
private networks, to virtual private and hybrid networks, 800 and 900
number services, billing, to plain old telephone service. The provision of
network transmission, switching, billing and intelligence-based services
may be accomplished pursuant to regulated tariff, by contract, or by a
combination of the two.
As competition has increased, regulators have tended to afford net-
work owner/providers greater flexibility in providing services under
contract.6 Even where services are not provided pursuant to contract,
network owner/providers have been granted greater flexibility in pro-
viding many services under tariff.e8 Where the services are offered on a
Bulletin Boards and Defamation: Who Should Be Liable? Under What Standard?, 2 J.L. &
TECH. 121 at 134 (1993). See also David J. Conner, Cubby v. Compuserve, Defamation Law on
the Electronic Frontier, 2 GEo. MASON U. L. REy. 227 (1993); and David R. Johnson & Kevin A.
Marks, Mapping Electronic Data Communications Onto Existing Legal Metaphors: Should We
Let Our Conscience (and Our Contracts) Be Our Guide?, 38 VILL. L. REV. 487 (1993). It is
reasonably argued, however, that if a sysop knows the statement to be false, or should have
known, or if the sysop fails to delete libelous information once notified by the injured party, sysop
may be sued for publication of libel. See Charles at 147-148; Johnson & Marks at 497.
67. In re AT&T Communications, Contract Tariff F.C.C. Nos. 2-13, 15; 9 F.C.C.R. 299
(1994) (affirming the FCC decision to allow AT&T to offer business services under contract tar-
iffs). The Commission has permitted AT&T to offer services under tariff via individually negoti-
ated contracts provided the contract tariffs are made generally available to similarly situated cus-
tomers under substantially similar circumstances. See In re Competition in the Interstate Inter-
exchange Marketplace, 6 F.C.C.R. 5880, 5896-97 (1991), recon. in part, 6 F.C.C.R. 7569 (1991),
further recon., 7 F.C.C.R. 2677 (1992) (inter-exchange Order).
68. In re Tariff Filing Requirements for Non-dominant Common Carriers, 8 F.C.C.R. 6752
(1993). While the FCC has substantially deregulated the telecommunications industry, it cannot
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common carrier or quasi-common carrier basis, the network provider
has tended to limit network access based on the type and class of ser-
vice, network integrity, security and capacity.
Aside from government-mandated responsibilities to foreclose op-
portunities for harassing, indecent or obscene speech to reach protected
subscribers, carriers have tended to eschew control of information con-
tent, thereby foregoing liability for customer communication. This
practice has been sanctioned by federal and many state regulatory bod-
ies. Also, carriers have traditionally sought to limit their liability for
loss or damage to customer communications.69 Until recently, these ef-
forts have been successful.70
compel carriers to eschew the filing of tariffs if they so desire. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1195-96 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Prior to the Commission's initial foray into de-
regulation, carriers were required to file tariffs as much as 90 days in advance of their proposed
effective date to allow Commission and public review of the proposed offerings and rates. See
MCI Telecommunications Corporation v. Federal Communications Commission and United
States of America, 765 F.2d 1186; 247 U.S. App. D.C. 32, July 9, 1985. In the Matter of Policy
and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, Part 1 of 3, 4 FCC Rcd 2873; 1989 FCC
LEXIS 860; 66 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 372, Apr. 17, 1989.
The Commission's permissive tariffing policy which allowed non-dominant carriers to elect
not to file tariffs was recently overturned, by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. This result was much to the disagreement of at least one former chair of the FCC. See
Sikes in Parting Shot to Congress Wants Forbearance Restored, Report on AT&T, Jan. 18, 1993.
Nevertheless, shortly after the circuit court's decision, the Commission has approached the
line of absolute deregulation by allowing non-dominant carriers to file tariffs on one day's notice
under the rationale that they do not possess sufficient market power to set rates for competitive
service offerings. See In the Matter of Tariff Filing Requirements for Nondominant Common
Carriers, 8 FCC Rcd 6752; 1993 FCC LEXIS 4285; 73 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 849, Aug. 18,
1993. The Circuit Court's decision was recently upheld by the Supreme Court.
69. See James Brook, Contractual Disclaimer and Limitation of Liability Under the Law of
New York, 49 BROOK. L. Rav. 1, 22 (1982); Phillip S. Cross, Utility Liability Waivers: New
Rules for New Technologies, 129 PuB. UTIL. FORT., June 15, 1992, at 34. See generally Annota-
tion, Liability of Telegraph or Telephone Company for Transmitting or Permitting Transmission
of Libelous or Slanderous Messages, 91 A.L.R.3d 1015 (1979 & Supp. 1993). Telephone compa-
nies retain the right to refuse service where a subscriber uses obscene or profane speech. See Allan
L. Schwartz, Annotation, Right of Telephone or Telegraph Company to Refuse, or Discontinue,
Service Because of Use of Improper Language, 32 A.L.R.3d 1041 (1970 & Supp. 1993).
70. Carriers are often successful in limiting their liability for provision of service. M.R.C.S.,
Inc. v. MCI, No. Cir. A. 86-3831, 1987 WL 12813, at 2 (E.D. La. June 17, 1987) (claims against
carrier for poor quality transmission are limited to the terms of the tariff). See also Brook, supra
note 69, at 22. However, there are numerous instances in which the courts have refused to allow
exculpatory language in carrier tariffs to limit carriers' liability. See In re Illinois Bell Switching
Station Litig., No. 73999, 1993 WL 323120, at 5 (Ill. Aug. 26, 1993) (carrier's exculpatory tariff
language limiting liability for consequential damages is not controlling in the face of willful viola-
tion of a state statute and regulations requiring utility to provide adequate and efficient, just and
reasonable facilities); Source Assoc. Inc. v. MCI, No. Cir. A. 88-2324-S., 1989 WL 134580, at 2-
3 (D. Kan. Oct. 6, 1989) (tariff does not limit liability for willful misconduct); D. Calaro v.
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A recent court decision has held that telecommunications network
owners have electronic video speech rights as extensive as cable video
distribution network providers. 1 If the case is upheld on appeal, and if
the telecommunications network providers exercise their speech and ed-
itorial rights by limiting the access and speech of users, attempts to
limit speech-related liabilities may, and increasingly should, prove less
successful.
72
For instance, in a related area, bulletin board/E-mail providers
have the ability to control access and screen speech content on their
systems. a While some do not actively seek to control access, or more
importantly, content, others do. As a result, while one provider has
been successful in avoiding liability for libelous statements made by
one of its users, it is not clear that others will fare as well.74 Moreover,
the decision to control content places the service provider in a difficult
position when it either fails to prohibit offensive speech quickly or pros-
ecutes other speech in a seemingly biased manner .7
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 725 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (reasonableness of public
utility's tariff limitation becomes an issue of fact where utility can but does not timely remedy
customer's problem resulting in a loss which exceeds tariff limitation on liability); Lahke v. Cin-
cinnati Bell, Inc., 439 N.E.2d 928, 931 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981) (carrier's exculpatory tariff lan-
guage is not controlling in the face of violation of a state statute requiring utility to provide
necessary and adequate facilities).
71. See Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909, 931-
32 (E.D. Va. 1993) (holding that telco-cable cross-ownership regulation which prohibited tele-
phone companies from providing video programming to subscribers in the telephone companies'
service areas contravenes the First Amendment).
72. There are numerous instances in which the courts have refused to allow exculpatory
language in carrier tariffs to limit carriers' liability. See supra note 70.
There are also a growing number of cases extending tort liability to providers of goods and
services generated via the use of computer and information technologies. See generally Barry B.
Sookman, The Liability of Information Providers in Negligence, 5 COMPUTER LAW & PRACTICE
141 (1989).
73. "[S]ysops have the right to run their systems any way they see fit. They have no 'com-
mon carrier' obligations, as do the telephone companies, to transmit everyone's messages." Meeks,
supra note 66, at S14. According to some, a sysop is a publisher with the corresponding right to
edit or shape the bulletin board's message traffic as he sees fit. Id.
74. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
75. See generally Stuart Silverstein, Prodigy Services' Fee Set Up Under Probe, L.A.
TIMEs, Apr. 16, 1991, at D1; Moore, supra note 44, at 13.
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2. Network Owner/Information Provider and Consumer!
Subscribers
a. Telephony and Telecommunications
The need for interconnection and the economies of scale inherent
in provision of local telephone service led in significant part to the crea-
tion of government-sanctioned telephone monopolies. Government then
sought to assure public access to the monopoly provider by requiring
that the provider not discriminate between customers on the basis of
facilities or the price paid for the services provided.7 6
As a further means of assuring non-discrimination, the telephone
companies were not allowed any control over the content of information
they transmitted. More recently, however, telephone companies have
been allowed to deny billing and collection services to dial-a-porn prov-
iders deemed undesirable by the carriers.77 Also, government require-
ments that the dominant, long-distance common carrier not engage in
the provision of information services and local common carriers not
provide electronic video services within their local markets have been
overturned. According to a recent district court opinion, local telephone
companies now have video electronic speech rights. n Should the deci-
sion be upheld on appeal, there is still a question of how this newly
articulated speech right will merge with the telephone company owner's
property right vis-A-vis control of access and content. 9 Many potential
76. Warren G. Lavey, The Public Policies that Changed the Telephone Industry Into Reg-
ulated Monopolies: Lesson from Around 1915, 39 FED. COM. LJ. 171, 171-76 (1989).
77. Information Providers, 928 F.2d at 866; Carlin, 827 F.2d at 1291.
78. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909, 931-32
(E.D. Va. 1993).
79. See Andrews, supra note 47, at D5; FCC Upholds GTE Cerritos Waiver, Grants An-
other, BROADCASTING MAG., May 1, 1989, at 136.
This change in policy has been opposed by broadcasters, cable operators, and newspaper pub-
lishers. More recently, the House of Representatives has considered H.R. 3636 which would allow
the telephone companies to provide video programming to subscribers in the telephone companies'
service area. See H.R. Rep. No. 3636, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 201, 651-57 (1993). See also
Kate Gerwig, The Beef of the Bills, COMMUNICATIONSWEEK, Dec. 20, 1993, at 5. See generally
House Lawmakers Seek End to Telephone, Cable Monopolies, REPORT ON AT&T, Dec. 6, 1993;
Markey Introduces Telecommunications Infrastructure Bill, COMMON CARRIER WEEK, Nov. 29,
1993, at 8-7.
The Senate has also considered of a bill introduced by Senator Hollings, which inter alia
would allow telco entry into the video programming market in the telco's service area. Cable
operators have lobbied against the time table to telco entry in this bill. See Edmund L. Andrews,
A Free-For-All in Communications, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1994, at Dl.
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competitors and customers of local carriers possessing essential facili-
ties have voiced concern over the potential for unfair competition."
In the area of switched, interactive telecommunications, the di-
verse set of relationships addressed above is expanding even further as
interactive video distribution capabilities come on line and user access
to network functionalities increases via manipulation of network intelli-
gence."' It is here that the newest potential for increased access and
electronic speech is to be found.82
As fiber optic, computer and switched telephony technologies
merge, so do the previously separate network functions and information
streams of telephony, broadcasting, cable and print.83 As this occurs,
there is a potential danger that the network owner as the transmission
provider and a potential speaker may experience a conflict of interest
between the provision of network-related services to users who, like the
network owner, are also information providers. Newspaper publishers,
cablecasters and broadcasters have raised this potential for conflict of
80. The National Cable Television Association has gone so far as to intervene on the gov-
ernment's side in its efforts to deny the entry of the Regulated Bell Operating Companies
(RBOCs) into the video programming markets existing in the RBOC's service areas. See An-
drews, supra note 79, at D15; COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Feb. 11, 1993, at 8. Newspaper publish-
ers were previously similarly opposed to RBOC entry into the provision of information services.
See John A. Farrell, Newspapers Roll Out Lobbyists in Electronic Information Fight, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 27, 1991, at C5. More recently, some publishers have favored telco entry into the video
programming market based on safeguards included within H.R. 3636. Safeguards would include:
telco use of separate video subsidiary with separate accounting, books, customer lists and physical
location; establishment of a video platform with 75 % of its capacity available to all; and entry by
overbuild rather than acquisition except under limited waiver circumstances. See H.R. Rep. No.
3636, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. § 201, 651-57 (1993). See also Gerwig, supra note 79, at 5. See
generally House Lawmakers Seek End to Telephone, Cable Monopolies, supra note 79; Markey
Introduces Telecommunications Infrastructure Bill, supra note 79.
81. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. See Andrews, supra note 79, at D15.
82. The distribution of intelligence throughout the public switched network rather than
solely in the central office switch could ultimately result in the ability of network users to program
the network. Users could then use the network to transport and manipulate information as the
users dictate. The ability to determine how, when, where and in what formats information may be
transmitted enhances the ability to engage in electronic speech. It establishes the user, rather than
the network owner, as the arbiter of the manner in which their electronic communication is cre-
ated, manipulated, routed and transmitted. The increased ability to program the network may be
viewed as the ability to engage in "service creation." See generally Commissioner Sherrie P. Mar-
shall, Huck Finn and the Intelligent Network, Remarks before the Advanced Intelligent Network
Communications Forum, June 25, 1990; Steven Titch, The Pathway to Freedom; Local Exchange
Carriers, Advanced Intelligent Networks, TELEPHONY, Apr. 15, 1991, at 30; and Edmund L.
Andrews, Business Technology, Opening Nation's Phone Networks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1991, at
D5.
83. See Allen S. Hammond, IV, Regulating Broadband Communications Networks, 9
YALE J. ON REG. 181, 183-91 (1992).
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interest as a reason for continuing the prohibition against local tele-
phone companies' entry into the information and video distribution
markets.8 4 While these arguments have found sympathetic ears in Con-
gress, they have proved less persuasive before the FCC and at least one
district court.85
Similar complaints have been raised in other instances where ac-
cess to transmission and owner speech merge. These instances concern
the exercise of access and content control by bulletin board service
providers, as well as the provision of access and speech related services
by cable television media.8 6
b. Computer Networks
According to a number of legal commentators, individual subscrib-
ers to commercial or private computer bulletin board services have no
access rights. Access is garnered by contract, and control of ac-
cess-and ultimately speech-resides, in the first instance, with the ser-
vice provider or the system operator. While there is very little informa-
tion on the criteria employed for denying initial access, revocation of
access is the ultimate sanction employed by system operators to disci-
pline miscreant member users.8 7 There are options short of denial of
access that are also employed.
At base, the rationale for system operator control of access is own-
ership of the system facilities. With regard to system operator content
control, the recent Cubby v. Compuserve decision provides some indica-
tion of the considerations militating against system operator exercise of
content control.88 The greater the discernable control that the system
84. Id. at 196-98.
85. See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D.
Va. 1993).
86. Regarding restrictions on access to on-line data systems, see Silverstein, supra note 75,
at D2; Michael Schuyler, Systems Librarian and Automation Review: Rights of Computer On
Line Service Users, SMALL COMPUTERS IN LIBRARIES, Dec. 1990, at 41; Moore, supra note 44, at
13.
With regard to discriminatory provision of leased access to cable television, see generally
supra note 67; Henry Gilgoff, Report Card on Cablevision" Mixed Signals Programs Praised,
Fees Criticized, NEWSDAY, Sept. 10, 1990, at 2, 3; Chuck Stogel, Amid Cable TV Tangle, Is
Viewer Being Served, SPORTING NEws, Aug. 27, 1990, at 45. The more recent leased access
provisions have been upheld as constitutional.
87. It may be that due to the relative newness of these services and the necessity to have
access to the appropriate telephony and computer equipment, access is controlled by economic and
market demand factors.
88. Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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operator exercises over access and content, the greater its potential lia-
bility to users and third parties for damage caused by the information's
content.
In Cubby, Compuserve, an on-line-information service provider,
was sued, unsuccessfully, for the alleged libel of a third party competi-
tor of a bulletin board provided on the service provider's system. In
determining that Compuserve was not liable for the alleged libel, the
court established by implication that heightened control of the commu-
nicated content would have resulted in liability."9
In another libel action ultimately settled out of court, Prodigy, an-
other system operator, was sued for an alleged libel of a third party by
a Prodigy subscriber.90 Unlike Compuserve and many other system op-
erators, however, Prodigy distinguishes itself based on the extent of
control it exercises over transmitted content. 1 As a consequence, there
was speculation that Prodigy might not have easily extricated itself
from liability. 2
c. Constitutionally Based Access and Speech Rights in Tradi-
tional Media: Broadcasting and Cable TV
Historically, market entry and technological considerations have
affected the apportionment of access and speech rights between media
owner/providers and the public. While, as a practical matter, electronic
speech has been protected under the constitution regardless of whether
it is in a print,93 voice,"' or video 95 format, traditional media owners in
89. Compuserve was deemed a distributor rather than a publisher based on several factors.
Based on its determination that Compuserve was a distributor, the court held that Compuserve
would have had to have knowledge or reason to know that the remarks of the Journalism Forum
were allegedly defamatory. Id.
90. Medphone Corp., a small New Jersey company sued Peter DeNigris, a 41-year-old
Long Island, N.Y., elections forms processor and amateur stock investor, in federal court in New
Jersey. Medphone alleged that DeNigris' comments on Money Talk, a bulletin board service oper-
ated by Prodigy, helped cause an almost 50% decline in the company's stock in the summer of
1992. Medphone also alleged that DeNigris engaged in libel and securities fraud. See generally
Amy Harmon, New Legal Frontier: Cyberspace, L.A. Timas, Mar. 19, 1993, at Al.
91. Prodigy is not named as a defendant in the Medphone suit. However, its insistence on
screening all electronic messages on its system has led some to argue it is a publisher and there-
fore should have some liability for libelous statements made over its facilities. Id. at A24.
The $40 million suit filed against Denigris was settled for $1.00 in late November 1993. See
Fred Vowlgelstein, Computer Libel Suit Settled, Issue Isn't, NEWSDAY, Dec. 28, 1993, at 19;
Kurt Eichenwald, Medphone Blames Messenger for its Stock Price Troubles, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
28, 1993, at D8.
92. Harmon, supra note 90, at A24.
93. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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each industry have been accorded different First Amendment rights
vis-a-vis users based on differing assessments of the ease of economic
and technological entry into each market.
The initial scarcity of broadcast frequencies relative to public de-
mand for access resulted in the requirement that the broadcast licensee
share its frequency with the public.9 This "sharing" took the form of
limitation on the broadcaster's exercise of programming discretion.
With FCC-engineered deregulation of broadcasting, the fairness doc-
trine, community ascertainment regulations, and programming guide-
lines were abolished or seriously compromised. 97 Subsequent to deregu-
lation and the abolition of the fairness doctrine, the scope of access-
sharing was ultimately limited to candidates for political office. 98 Even
94. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
95. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991) (cable); and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (broadcasting).
96. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); see also Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). In Red Lion, the Supreme Court recognized broadcast-
ers as having a qualified constitutional speech right. However, broadcasters' editorial speech rights
were held secondary to the rights of listeners and viewers to receive diverse information and ideas.
The Court stated in relevant part:
[The First Amendment] has a major role to play [in public broadcasting] as the Congress
itself recognized in § 326, which forbids FCC interference with "the right of free speech
by means of radio communication." . . . But the people as a whole retain their interest in
free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium function consistently
with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters which is paramount... It is the purpose of the
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ulti-
mately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by
the Government itself or a private licensee.
Id. at 389-90.
97. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (broadcasters could not be
compelled to accept editorial advertisements covering controversial issues); see also Syracuse
Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1019 (1990).
98. Broadcasters may not be compelled to accept editorial advertisements for broadcast
when they are already adhering to an obligation to present controversial issues of public impor-
tance fairly. They retain the right to decide what controversial "issues are to be discussed and by
whom, and when." CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 130.
Most recently, the Federal Communications Commission successfully abolished the Fairness
Doctrine because it "chilled" broadcasters' exercise of their editorial discretion, caused a reduc-
tion in the coverage of controversial issues, and hence deserved the First Amendment interests of
the public. See 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987), recon. denied, 3 F.C.C.R. 2035 (1989), a f'd, Syracuse
Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir 1989), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1019 (1990).
The Commission rested a significant part of its rationale for advocating the repeal of the
Fairness Doctrine on technological grounds: "We believe that the dramatic changes in the elec-
tronic media, together with the unacceptable chilling effect resulting from the implementation of
such regulations as the Fairness Doctrine, form a compelling and convincing basis on which to
reconsider First Amendment principles developed for another market." Id. at 84.
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before the fairness doctrine was "abolished," its potential power to re-
quire access had been significantly limited by judicial decisions."
The current scope of government-exercised content control over
the broadcast licensee extends to the prohibition of speech that is
libelous, indecent or obscene. 100 Users have a right to diverse informa-
tion but no right to speak as individuals or information providers absent
owner permission.
According to at least one legal scholar, government regulation of
access to cable channels is justified because franchises are scarce due to
the physical limits inherent in the use of public rights of way. 1°1 The
physical scarcity is further exacerbated by the economies of scale in-
herent in the provision of cable service.102 For these reasons, the cable
franchisee is required to share its channels of communication with the
public and other information providers. Concerns about the continued
availability of local news and public affairs programming, as well as
economic market and anticompetitive constraints alleged to have been
imposed by cable firms, have been used to justify limits on the control
cable franchisees may exercise over broadcaster access to the cable net-
works.03 The leased access, must carry and public access channels are
an attempt by Congress to assure third party access to cable net-
works. 04 According to one scholar, the leased access rules have proved
only moderately successful. Moreover, as a result of recent litigation,
the must carry requirements are under a potential constitutional
cloud.' 05
99. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (broadcasters could not be com-
pelled to accept editorial advertisements covering controversial issues).
100. See, e.g., Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1282 (1992); and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
101. See Michael Meyerson, The First Amendment and the Cable Operator: An Unpro-
tected Shield Against Public Access Requirements, 4 COMMENT 1 (1981).
102. See Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I.
1983), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that mandatory cable channel
access rules are constitutional based on theory of economic scarcity); cf. Preferred Communica-
tions v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), afid, 476 U.S. 488 (1986) (requiring
cable operator to set aside mandatory and leased access channels diminishes the operator's free-
dom of expression).
103. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 1994 WL 279691 (U.S. Dist. Ct.) June
27, 1994 at 5, 6, citing congressional fact finding hearings regarding the Cable Television Con-
sumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, summarized in S. REP. No. 102-92, pp. 3-4
(1991) and H.R. REP. No. 102-628, at 74 (1992); as well as the conclusions Congress reached
which are recited in sections 2(a)(1) through (21) of the Act.
104. See The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 531 (public, educa-
tional and governmental access channels), and § 532 (leased access channels).
105. Cable operators engage in constitutionally protected speech activities. See Leathers v.
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The cable franchisee's control of communicated content is con-
Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 26 (1991); City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476
U.S. 494 (1986). The courts, however, have decided whether cable operators are more akin to
newspaper publishers or broadcasters. Consequently, the constitutional status of cable operator
speech is still unsettled. See Turner Broadcasting Sys. Inc. v. FCC, [1993] U.S.L.W. at A-798
(May 5, 1993) (request for injunction against enforcement of must carry section of Cable Act of
1992 legislation denied). Moreover, the recent FCC promulgation of rate regulations for cable
service coupled with the multi-tiered access requirements render cable more akin to common car-
riage telephony than the Congress or the courts have been willing to acknowledge.
The Supreme Court has unanimously affirmed that cable operators engage in constitutionally
protected speech activities. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 1994 WL 279691 (U.S.
Dist. Ct.) June 27, 1994 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991)). More important,
for the first time, the Court has established a substantive legal distinction between the First
Amendment regulation of cable television on the one hand, and that of broadcast television and
newspapers on the other. A majority of the Court has held that because cable television does not
suffer from the technical limitations of channel (spectrum) scarcity and channel interference of
broadcasting, the less stringent standard of First Amendment scrutiny applicable to broadcasting
is not applicable to cable television. Turner at 8. For different reasons, according to the Court,
cable television is distinguishable from newspapers as well. Newspaper publishers cannot obstruct
or prevent reader access to other publications. Cable television operators, however, by virtue of the
technology, possess bottleneck or gatekeeper control over the subscribers access to other speakers.
Turner at 16. Because of the bottleneck control which cable operators enjoy and the potential for
abuse that such control entails, First Amendment regulation of cable television requires a less
stringent standard than that applied to newspapers. Turner at 16.
While the court did not address the potential distinctions or similarities between telephony
and cable, it may have provided a glimmer of a majority of the Court's view on the issue in
addressing the bottleneck power of local cable operators. Indeed, the most telling passage from the
case may prove to be the Court's assessment of the government's affirmative responsibility in the
face of the potential exercise of private power over bottleneck facilities. The Court majority
stated: "The First Amendment's command that government not impede the freedom of speech
does not disable the government from taking steps to ensure that private interests not restrict,
through physical control of a critical pathway of communication, the free flow of information and
ideas." Turner at 16.
At least one broadcast industry commenter on the Turner opinion has alluded to the potential
impact of this portion of the opinion. See Doug Halonen, Cable, Broadcast Weigh Must-Carry
Ruling, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, July 4, 1994, at 3. For further press analysis-of the Supreme Court's
Turner Broadcasting decision, see Ana Puga, Congress Upheld on Cable Rule; But Court Orders
Review of 1st Amendment Issues, THE BOSTON GLOBE, June 28, 1994, at 35; More Evidence
Needed; U.S. Supreme Court Vacates Must-Carry Decision, Remands It to Lower Court, COMM.
DAILY, June 28, 1994, at 1; John Lippman, For Now, TV Viewers Are Spared Another Juggling
of the Channels; Cable: A Final High Court Ruling on the 'Must-Carry' Statute Could be Years
Away, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 1994, Part D, at 5; David G. Savage, High Court OKs Congress'
Right to Regulate Cable TV; L.A. TIMEs, June 28, 1994, Part A; at 1; Linda Greenhouse, The
Media Business: Justices Back Cable Regulation, N.Y. TImES, June 28, 1994, § D, at 1; Joan
Biskupic, Supreme Court Connects Cable TV To Free Speech Protections of Press, WASH. POST,
June 28, 1994, at Al. For a synopsis of many of the key holdings of the case see Case Digests:
Federal Cases; United States Supreme Court; First Amendment-Communications, N.J.L.J.,
July 4, 1994, at 76.
Although a majority of the Court found that the must carry rules are constitutional in the
abstract, the Court remanded the case back to the district court. The Court found that the govern-
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strained by legal sanctions that may be imposed for indecent speech.110
In part due to the necessity to avoid government-imposed sanctions,
cable franchisees are compelled to exert editorial control over matter
provided by third party information providers that may be deemed
indecent. 07
V. REGULATORY SHIFTS IN THE AGE OF CONVERGENCE AND
PRIVATIZATION: SOME PRELIMINARY ANSWERS
A. Network as Asset
1. Private Firms and Closed User Groups
Where the network is the private asset of the firm, employee and
third party efforts to assert First Amendment rights of access or speech
over internal communications systems have been limited.10 8 In the case
of employees of private firms, the National Labor Relations Act may
allow them to negotiate for speech rights provided the rights are exer-
cised for the protest or discussion of working conditions. 10 9 All argu-
ment's interests in promoting diversity of information from competing sources, preserving 40% of
the society's access to economically viable broadcast stations, and promoting fair competition in
the video distribution market are compelling. Turner at 19-20. It also determined, however, that
the government had failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that broadcast stations are in
economic jeopardy and that the must carry rules will actually advance the government's interests
by materially alleviating the economic harm. Turner at 20-22. Because the Court remanded the
case back to the district court, the ultimate impact of the Turner Court's pronouncements on
cable regulatory First Amendment status vis a vis newspapers is unclear. Justice Harry Blackmun,
who sided with the majority, has subsequently retired. It is not clear how his apparent successor,
Justice Stephen Breyer, would rule on this matter, or the basic constitutionality of the must carry
rules themselves. See Halonen, infra.
106. Alliance, supra note 49, at 815. See also First Report and Order in the Matter of
Implementation of Section 10 of the Cable Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 8
FCC Red 998; 1993 Lexis 3144, Feb. 3, 1993. In response to a request for rehearing by the
Federal Communications Commission and the Department of Justice, the Appeals Court for the
District of Columbia Circuit recently agreed to an en banc rehearing of the Alliance case. See
COMM. DAILY, Feb. 22, 1994, at 5.
For commentary and limited analysis of Section 10, see Timothy B. Dyk & Sarah L. Wan-
ner, Developments in Communications Law: The FCC's Indecency Proposals Under Fire, LEGAL
TIMES, May 17, 1993, at 25; Bruce Fein, Cable Discretion and the First Amendment, WASH.
TIMEs, Dec. 2, 1992, at G1 (arguing that the Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1992
properly permits cable operators to eschew carriage on access channels of programming the opera-
tors deem to be obscene or sexually explicit).
107. Id. at 815.
108. See Electronic Media Regulation and the First Amendment: Future Perspective,
supra note 3, at 5. See generally Wilson, supra note 55; Rifkin, supra note 54.
109. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (public employees may not be fired for
making statements about matters of public concern). See generally Estlund, supra note 11, at
923-24. The question of whether employees can make such statements over the company's E-mail
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ments for fairness and ethics aside, beyond the narrow entitlement of
the NLRA, employees of private firms enjoy little real access or speech
rights to corporate network assets. Ultimately, the company network
owner may limit or control access and speech." 0
2. Public Firms
Employees of public (government) entities are similarly limited.
The First Amendment has been interpreted to afford such employees
the right to speak on matters of public interest.'1 ' They, like their pri-
vate brethren, also receive some protection from a variety of state
"whistle blower" statutes. Aside from these protections, however, pub-
lic employees have no rights of access or speech to internal communica-
tions systems. At least one commentator has forcefully argued that pri-
vate and public employees should enjoy the same scope of speech rights
encompassing comment on work and product quality related matters."'
Access to the networks of closed user groups is also limited." 3
Here, absent a showing that the network asset is being used unlawfully
to restrain competition,"" the user group may exercise control over ac-
cess or speech on virtually all aspects of the network. Nevertheless, the
or telephone systems, however, has not been addressed to date.
110. The monitoring of employee E-mail is justified as a legitimate method of protecting
business assets and prerogatives. The monitoring of employee E-mail is growing, and many CIOs
agree that E-mail is part of the business property and, therefore, employers have a legal right to
see what it is being used for. Some business executives argue that "If the corporation owns the
equipment and pays for the network, that asset belongs to the company, and [they have] a right to
look and see if people are using it for purposes other than running the business." See Rifkin,
supra note 54, at 8.
Other commenters argue that monitoring E-mail of searching through personal files is flat
out wrong ... It's inconceivable to think of a circumstance where you should look at
anybody else's electronic mail, . . . Asking who owns the E-mail or the phone call is the
wrong question. A better question is, 'What kind of environment do people work most
happily and efficiently inT' Others, including labor unions, have pointed out that employee
monitoring can be demoralizing and counterproductive.
See Rifkin, supra note 54, at 85.
111. A government employee cannot be fired for non-disruptive exercise of her First
Amendment right to speak on matters of public concern. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
Provided, however, that the employer does not possess an interest in "effective and efficient fulfill-
ment of its responsibilities to the public" which outweigh the employee's interest in speaking. Id.
at 150-51.
112. See Estlund, supra note 11, at 923-24.
113. While arguments for absolute access to the networks of closed user groups seem inap-
propriate, it is reasonable to require access where the network is an essential facility or is used for
anti-competitive purposes. Similarly, it is reasonable to require some appropriate level of access
where a compelling public interest in the information to be provided.
114. See Stevens, supra note 7.
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exercise of control over access and speech carries a certain level of re-
sponsibility for actionable speech violations. The precise level of respon-
sibility has yet to be measured, however, and may ultimately depend on
the technology and the circumstances of each case." 5
B. Network as Product or Service
1. Convergence and Change: The Evolution of Speech Regulation
in Traditional Media and Telecommunications
While the traditional regulatory apportionment of network pro-
vider and user access and speech remains virtually intact in broadcast-
ing, it is under challenge in cable and telephony. The decision of Con-
gress to impose must carry requirements on cable franchisees has been
upheld for the moment. 16 It was recently affirmed in the Supreme
115. See generally Henry H. Perrit, Jr., The Congress, The Courts and Computer Based
Communications Networks: Answering Questions About Access and Content Control, 38 VILL L.
REv. 319 (1993).
116. Sections 4 and 5 of the Cable Communications and Consumer Protection Act require
cable systems of a certain size to carry, upon broadcaster request, the signals of certain licensed
commercial and non-commercial broadcast stations in the cable operator's market. Prior to enact-
ing the must carry rules as part of the Act, Congress determined that cable operators often enjoy
monopoly status as the only multi-channel provider in their respective markets. Congress also
determined that the horizontal concentration of cable outlets (outlets owned and operated by mul-
tiple system owners or MSOs) and the vertical integration of distribution and programming func-
tions in MSOs combined with monopoly status to create a "cable bottleneck." It was believed that
in many cases, this bottleneck precluded broadcasters and programmers unaffiliated with the cable
caster from acquiring needed access to cable channels and created opportunities for cable opera-
tors to discriminate against broadcasters in order to garner a larger share of advertising revenues
available in their market.
Several cable operators, among others, challenged the rules alleging that the provisions vio-
late cable operators' first amendment rights to freedom of speech. First, the provisions inhibit
cable operators' editorial discretion to determine what video programming messages to provide
and what programming not to provide. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32,
36 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Second, the provisions force cable operators to devote a portion of their finite
channel capacity to one class of speaker-competitors (broadcasters) regardless of what the cable
operator may chose to transmit. Id. at 36-37.
The district court panel ruled 2-1 that the provisions are constitutional. According to the
court, the provisions are "essentially economic regulation designed to create competitive balance
in the video industry as a whole, and to redress the effects of cable operators' anti-competitive
practices." Id. at 40.
The Congress, in particular the Senate, had reached the same conclusions. It viewed the
signal carriage provisions as "economic regulations" intended to promote competition between
broadcast and cable distribution systems and enhance viewpoint diversity available to cabled and
non-cabled homes.
According to the Senate, Congress enacted the regulations to ensure that cable operators do
not exercise their control over their distribution facilities in a manner which discriminated against
broadcasters. S. REP. No. 102-92, 138 Cong. Rec. 1133. The Senate also stated that the signal
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Court.117 Congress' prohibition against local telephone company owner-
ship of cable facilities in its service area and provision of video pro-
gramming has been challenged and overturned in one district court. It
too, is on appeal. Meanwhile, the cross-ownership ban is being chal-
lenged in other district courts as well. 1 8 The challenges to the must
carry provisions and the telephone-cable cross ownership ban are signif-
icant because they provide two of the judicial pillars upon which regu-
lation of the future electronic broadband networks will be built. This
follows because the cases address the regulation of speech in cable and
telephone, the two industries from which much of the broadband infra-
structure is likely to emerge." 9
It is clear that the cable television and regional telephone indus-
tries are considering opportunities to merge, following hard upon tech-
nology's lead. 2 ° Most regulators and industry analysts expect this
merger of industries and technologies to result in the provision of inter-
active, broadband, multimedia services. Thus, judicial pronouncements
on the relative rights of network owners to provide information over
their networks and to determine who other than themselves may speak
over their facilities are critical to the evolution of speech rights on the
new and evolving infrastructure.
A decision overturning the must carry rules is possible. Majorities
in both the district court and Supreme Court concluded the rules are
content neutral and the government's interests compelling.' 2' Neverthe-
carriage provisions are "not at all based on the content of those signals, but instead . . . counter-
balance cable systems' commercial or economic incentive to exclude . . . [broadcast signals]. S.
REP. No. 102-92, 138 Cong. Rec. 1133, 1189 (1992).
117. See Turner, supra note 105.
118. Challenges have recently been filed in Michigan and Illinois.
119. See sources cited supra note 1.
120. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. at 38-39.
121. The district court in Turner concluded that to the extent the First Amendment is im-
plicated at all by the must carry rules, it is a mere by-product of the fact that cable operators
transmit video signals having no other function than the communication of information. As such,
the must carry provisions are, in the court's mind, "unrelated to the content of any of the
messages the cable operators, broadcasters and programmers have in contemplation to deliver."
Id.
Moreover, to the extent that Congress may nevertheless be said to have authored content
related provisions, the relationship between the provisions and content is negligible, and is based at
most on an assumption that broadcasters have as much to say of interest or value as cable opera-
tors and diversity is better served by having both available to the public on cable facilities. Id. at
31.
Not surprisingly, the Congress, in particular the Senate stated that the signal carriage provi-
sions are "not at all based on the content of the broadcast signals, but instead . . . counterbalance
cable systems' commercial or economic incentive to exclude . . . [broadcast signals]. S. REP. No.
1994]
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less, a new majority of the Supreme Court still could conclude other-
wise.122 Justice O'Connor, like Judge Williams below, concluded that
Congress rested a significant portion of the justification for its must
carry rules on its desire to assure the continued provision of local news
and public affairs as well as educational programming by broadcast-
ers. 1 3  If so, Congress' reasons for adopting the must carry rules may
102-92, 138 Cong. Rec. 1133, 1189 (1992). The Senate made only an oblique acknowledgement
of the possible relevance of the First Amendment to cable operator speech rights, stating that:
"[t]he First Amendment supports government regulations intended to promote diversity of voices,
even if some incidental loss of editorial discretion results. Id.
122. The conclusion that the must carry rules pass constitutional muster may be in jeop-
ardy. As noted in note 105, supra, the composition of the Court has changed with Justice Black-
mun's retirement and Justice Breyer's succession. Consequently, there is no majority for much of
the Turner opinion as currently written, if the case returns to the Court subsequent to a full
hearing in the district court. It is not possible to know with any assurance how Justice Breyer
would vote if the case returns to the Court. Moreover, while it is unclear what further evidence
the parties will submit in the district court, it is likely that a subsequent Supreme Court will have
new information before it. Thus there are opportunities for a new majority to emerge.
123. Both the Supreme Court and district court dissents came to this conclusion. Justice
O'Connor, in her dissent joined by Justices Ginsburg, Scalia and Thomas, concluded that Con-
gress' reasons for adopting the rules certainly made significant reference to the content of infor-
mation to be provided by broadcasters. As such, strict scrutiny is required even where the govern-
ment's goals may be laudable. She stated:
Preferences for diversity of viewpoints, for localism, for educational programming, and
news and public affairs all make reference to content . . .The controversial judgement at
the heart of the statute is . . .that broadcasters should be preferred over cable program-
mers . . .The findings . . . represent Congress' reasons for adopting this preference...
and these reasons rest in part on the content of broadcasters' speech...
It may well be that Congress also had other, content-neutral, purposes in mind when
enacting the statute. But we have never held that the presence of a permissible justification
lessens the impropriety of relying in part on an impermissible justification.
1994 WL 279691, at 29.
Judge Stephen Williams' dissent in the district court also took considerable exception to the
impact of the must carry rules on cable operators and programmers. For Judge Williams, dissent,
the must carry rules impose a burden ". . . on one set of speakers for the direct and explicit
advantage of a limited class of their competitors-a class whose programming must, as a matter
of law, include news and public affairs programming, content of a type specified by the govern-
ment." District Court Opinion at 91.
The Supreme Court majority's conclusion that the must carry rules are unrelated to the con-
tent of the messages that the respective broadcasters and cable casters carry is questionable. It
ignores a major thrust of congressional and FCC broadcast policy stretching back more than 30
years.
The existence, quality and quantity of bonafide licensee provided local news and public affairs
programming has been a major broadcast regulatory issue almost from the inception of the ser-
vice. Licensee provision of news and public affairs programming has affected its chances of receiv-
ing an initial grant of a license or a renewal of an existing license. See Memorandum Opinion and
Order in the Matter of Formulation of Rules and Policies Relating to the Renewal of Broadcast
Licenses, 44 F.C.C.2d 405; 29 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1 (Dec. 12, 1973). Such programming has
figured prominently in FCC determinations of what constituted balanced programming under pre-
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be argued to rest in part on the content of broadcasters' speech and
may be deemed impermissible.'24 Also, upon remand, evidence of eco-
nomic harm may, upon closer analysis and examination of prior his-
tory, prove unable to establish a sufficient threat to the government's
vious enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine. See Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsider-
ation of the Fairness Report In the Matter of The Handling of Public Issues under the Fairness
Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 58 F.C.C.2d 691; 36
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1021 (Mar. 19, 1976).
Definitions of what constitutes acceptable news and public affairs programming, including
public oversight and agency enforcement, have evolved through-out the history of broadcast regu-
lation from the 1940's through successful deregulatory efforts in the 1980s. See generally REPORT
AND ORDER In the Matter of PRIMER ON ASCERTAINMENT OF COMMUNITY PROBLEMS By BROAD-
CAST APPLICANTS, 27 F.C.C.2d 650; 21 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1507 (Feb. 18, 1971); Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order In the Matter of Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees
to Maintain Certain Program Records, 43 F.C.C.2d 680 (Oct. 3, 1973); Report and Order In the
Matter of Amendment of the Primers on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Commercial
Broadcast Renewal Applicants and Noncommercial Educational Broadcast Applicants, Permittees
and Licensees, 76 F.C.C.2d 401; 47 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 189 (Mar. 12, 1980); Memorandum
Opinion and Order In the Matter of Amendment of the Commission's Rules Concerning Program
Definitions for Commercial Broadcast Stations by Adding a New Program Type, "Community
Service" Program and Expanding the "Public Affairs" Program Category and Other Related
Matters, 88 F.C.C.2d 1188; 1982 FCC LEXIS 721; 50 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1245 (Jan. 13,
1982); REPORT AND ORDER In the Matter of The Revision of Programming and Commercializa-
tion Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Tele-
vision Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076; 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1005 (June 27, 1984); Deregulation
of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d at 988; Commercial Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d at 1096.
Finally, the potential impact of competitive market entry on the provision of news and public
affairs programming has served as the linchpin for congressional, judicial and administrative regu-
lation of market competition. See REPORT AND ORDER In the Matter of Policies Regarding Detri-
mental Effects of Proposed New Broadcast Stations on Existing Stations, 3 FCC Rcd 638; 64
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 583 (Nov. 24, 1987).
124. For both dissents, strict scrutiny is triggered by the rules' impact. First, the must carry
rules mandate speech which the cable operators would not otherwise make and prohibit cable
operators from programming a portion of their channels as they might otherwise have done. 1994
WL 279691, at 27; and District Court Opinion at 85-86. Second, the rules do so in a manner
which directly burdens the cable operators' exercise of editorial control and speech. 1994 WL
279691, at 27; and District Court Opinion at 85-87. As a consequence of the cable operators' loss
of control over their channels of transmission, they suffer a direct, palpable, diminution of speech.
The dissenting opinions diverged once they concluded that the rules' impact triggered strict
scrutiny. Justice O'Connor concluded that the government's interests were not sufficiently compel-
ling to justify content based speech restrictions. 1994 WL 279691, at 29-30. Unfortunately, she
does not state what would constitute such a compelling interest. Judge Williams concluded that
while the government's interest in diversity was sufficiently compelling, its means of achieving its
goal was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to accomplish the government's purpose. First, there is
insufficient proof that requiring carriage of broadcasters will increase diversity. District Court
Opinion at 94. Second, there are less burdensome alternatives such as the leased access channel
provision, which would accomplish Congress' purpose. Id. at 95-96. While not conceding that the
government possessed a compelling interest, Justice O'Connor too concluded that the rules are
insufficiently tailored to achieve the government's stated goals. 1994 WL 279691, at 30.
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interest in the retention of viable broadcast stations.12 5 Thus it is possi-
125. The district court's dissent acknowledged as compelling the government's goal of assur-
ing access to television for Americans financially disinclined or incapable of subscribing to cable
as well as Americans who remain geographically remote from areas where broadcasting is offered.
However, the available evidence does not support the congressional finding that broadcasting is
being economically threatened by cable. Upon review of the proffered evidence, the dissent con-
cluded that:
. . . the legislative findings do not support the inferences needed to sustain must-carry...
(1) there is no finding of any present or imminent harm; (2) the evidence of some dropping
of some local broadcast channels in itself fails to show any widespread problem; (3) the
proliferation of local broadcast stations since the end of the FCC's must carry rules under-
mines any inference of a problem; (4) the findings as to structure and incentives, taken
together with the evidence of cable's dependence on broadcasting, fail to raise the concern
beyond the level of speculation; and (5) even if the hazard were perceptible, the record
does not address the less intrusive alternatives.
Id. at 108.
Moreover, Congress's efforts to establish evidence of broadcasting's economic demise prove no
less effective than prior efforts by the FCC and broadcasters. The must carry question is not the
first instance in which economic harm to existing broadcast stations has been raised against new
competitors.
In the broadcast economic injury cases, the courts and the Federal Communications Commis-
sion concluded that an existing broadcaster could prevent the entry of a new broadcast competitor
based on pleading economic harm unless its allegations of economic injury were supported by
proof of a significant loss in news and public affairs programming occasioned by a loss of advertis-
ing revenues. And, it also had to establish that this loss in news and public affairs programming
would not be alleviated by the new entrant. After years of litigation before it, the FCC concluded
that no broadcaster had been able to successfully meet the public interest burden. See REPORT
AND ORDER In the Matter of Policies Regarding Detrimental Effects of Proposed New Broadcast
Stations on Existing Stations, 3 FCC Rcd 638; 64 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 583 (Nov. 24, 1987).
The consistent inability of broadcasters to meet the burden of proof necessary to establish an
actionable economic detriment lead to the abolition of the economic injury objection in compara-
tive proceedings. The FCC, in abolishing the objection, stated that:
By this action, the Commission abolishes certain policies that address the issue of economic
injury to existing broadcast stations. Our decision is based on our experience in implement-
ing these policies and the intervening growth of the electronic media which lead us to
conclude that the public interest is no longer served by their retention ...
Our review of more than 80 cases indicates that, although parties may have routinely
pleaded [economic injury issues], they have been unable to demonstrate sufficient evidence
to warrant a finding of harm that would result in a net loss of service to the [public.] ...
We also conclude that the underlying premise of the Carroll doctrine, the theory of ruinous
competition, i.e., that increased competition in broadcasting can be destructive to the pub-
lic interest, is not valid in the broadcast field. The court, in Carroll, conceded that "private
economic injury is by no means always, or even usually, reflected in public detriment. Com-
petitors may severely injure each other to the great benefit of the public."
. . . consideration of allegations of economic injury to determine whether they will lead to
an overall derogation of service to the public is like looking for the proverbial "needle in a
haystack." On this basis, we will no longer entertain claims of Carroll injury . . ..
In coming to its conclusion, the FCC also cited congressional determinations that pleadings of
economic injury would be insufficient to preclude competitive market entry. See 2 FCC Rcd 3134;
Mar. 26, 1987 NOTICE OF INQUIRY.
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ble that the rules may be overturned under the reading of the law as
espoused by the dissent or the majority of the Supreme Court in Tur-
ner.126 Meanwhile, at least one court has held that the congressional
prohibition against telephone company provision of video services is un-
constitutional. 12 7 According to the district court in C & P v. United
The FCC's conclusions regarding existing broadcasters' inability to prove economic injury
over many years in numerous licensing proceedings, bear a significant similarity to the conclusions
reached by the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia in Quincy Cable TV, Inc. and those
reached by the dissent in Turner. In each instance, the evidence proffered is too speculative. In
Quincy, the court concluded that irrespective of the ultimate constitutionality of the rules:
• . . the Commission had not adequately substantiated its assertion that a substantial gov-
ernmental interest existed. . . the problem the must carry rules purported to prevent-the
destruction of free, local television-was merely a "fanciful threat" unsubstantiated by the
record or by two decades of experience with cable tv.
Century Cable at 295, citing the court's earlier Quincy opinion.
Indeed, in its subsequent effort to justify the must carry rules, the FCC did not even advance
an economic harm argument. A fact which the court noted, deeming that argument "foreclosed by
Quincy Cable TV." Century Communications, note 4, at 299.
126. As stated in note 105, supra, the Court's majority remanded the case to the district
court requiring the court to hear further evidence because the government had failed to provide
sufficient evidence to establish that broadcast stations are in economic jeopardy and that the must
carry rules will actually advance the government's interests by materially alleviating the economic
harm. Turner at 20-22. Only Justice Stevens would have voted for affirmance of the district court
opinion upon which the appeal was based. 1994 WL 279691 at 24.
127. See Telco Claims at 11. See Plaintiff's Complaint at 5. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel.
Co. of Va., and Bell Atlantic Video Services Co. v. United States (Bell Complaint). See also Bell
Atlantic Challenges Cable Act in U.S. District Court, supra note 80.
Regulated local exchange carriers ("LECs") have been prohibited from providing video dis-
tribution in their local markets since 1970. At that time, the FCC issued a rule prohibiting a
telephone company from owning a cable concern in the same market. See 47 CFR §§ 63.54(a)
and (b), and note 1(a). The rule was promulgated to prevent anti-competitive activities of some
LECs who sought to control the entry of cable into their markets by restricting or controlling
cable operator access to telephone facilities and pole attachments. See generally Applications of
Telephone Common Carriers for Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facilities Furnished to Af-
filiated Community Antenna Television Systems (Final Report and Order), 21 F.C.C.2d 307 (Jan.
28, 1970), recon. in part, 22 F.C.C.2d 746 (1970), aff'd, General Telephone Co. of S.W. v. United
States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971).
In 1984, Congress codified the FCC's telco-cable cross ownership rules in the Cable Commu-
nications Act of 1984. See the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 ("1984 Cable Act") 47
U.S.C. § 613(b). The legislative history of Section 613(b) indicates that it was intended to codify
the then current FCC telco-cable cross-ownership rules prohibiting telephone companies from di-
rectly providing video programming to subscribers in their telephone markets. See H.R. REP. No.
934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 56; and 130 Cong. Rec. H 10,444 (daily Oct. 1, 1984).
The FCC subsequently reversed its earlier decision, and concluded that the public interest
would be better served by partially lifting the cross ownership ban. See Further Notice of Inquiry
and Notice Proposed Rulemaking, 3 F.C.C.R. 5849 (July 20, 1988), CC Docket 87-266, Tele-
phone Company-Cable Television Cross Ownership Rules, §§ 63.54-63.58, FCC 88-249 (released
Sept. 22, 1988). The Commission concluded that subject to safeguards, the public would receive
significant benefits if telephone companies were allowed to provide cable television service. It ten-
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States, the availability of workable regulatory alternatives that do not
deny local video speech to the entire class of telephone company speak-
ers render the prohibition unconstitutionally over-broad. The C & P
suit is not the first effort undertaken by the Regulated Bell Operating
Companies to defeat the cross ownership ban on constitutional
grounds. 2
tatively concluded that "construction and operation of technologically advanced, integrated broad-
band networks by carriers for the purpose of providing video programming and other services
[would] constitute good cause for a waiver of the prohibition." See 3 F.C.C.R. 5849, 5870 (1988).
Congress, however, did not repeal its law.
In light of Congress' refusal to remove the prohibition, Bell Atlantic filed suit alleging that
the 1984 Cable Act prohibition violates the First and Fifth Amendment rights of LECs as well as
the First Amendment rights of subscribers. Bell Atlantic argued that video programming is a form
of constitutionally protected speech which it is not allowed to present on its own network. See Bell
Complaint, supra note 124. According to the carrier, the statutory definition of video program-
ming, the 1984 Cable Act prohibition is a direct abridgement of Bell Atlantic's First Amendment
rights because the company and its subsidiaries are prohibited from engaging in video speech. In
its Complaint, Bell Atlantic alleges that under sections 522 (16) and 533(b) of the act:
Congress has required government officials to decide whether telephone companies are pro-
viding prohibited speech that is "generally considered comparable to" television program-
ming or whether they are providing non-prohibited speech which may also involve video
images. This. . . process. . involves an evaluation of the video images and the context in
which they are presented; a consideration of the impact such video images will have upon
the viewer; and a determination whether such video images will be perceived by the general
public as a substitute for the forms of video speech that have been provided by others over
traditional cable and broadcasting facilities.
Id. at 6.
Consequently, Bell Atlantic is not allowed to reach its customers through its own video
or video on demand programming. Id. See also Judge Examines Telco Claims to First
Amendment Cable Rights, Common Carrier Week, vol. 10, No. 25 (June 21, 1993) [here-
inafter Telco Claims]. Further, the company argues that the statute does not serve a "com-
pelling," "substantial" or "important" government interest. Bell Complaint at 6. The
speech in question would not be illegal. In any event, the underlying goal of the legislation
has not been achieved because a local monopoly in video transmission developed despite the
statute. Id. at 7. Finally, the economic rationale for the statutory prohibition is argued to
be vague and prophylactic because it looks to protect against future imagined abuses which
the telephone companies might perpetrate.
See Telco Claims.
128. Prior to the C&P [Bell Atlantic] law suit, the government has addressed the constitu-
tionality of restricting telephone company access to information markets in three separate pro-
ceedings, occurring in three respective venues. The issue was first raised in the modification of
final judgement proceeding in 1982 and subsequently addressed again in that proceeding in 1987.
In that proceeding, District Court Judge Harold Green issued an order which, inter alia, approved
an agreement between AT&T and the Justice Department precluding the soon to be divested
Regional Bell Operating Companies from entering the information services market as "electronic
publishers." United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 227 (D.D.C. 1982), affid sub nom. Mary-
land v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
There were two stated rationales for the prohibition. First, was the perception that the
RBOCs would use the monopoly control of their facilities in anticompetitive ways which would
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Under such circumstances, the user's control over access and
impede the development of the nascent electronic publishing industry. Second, the perception that
allowing RBOC entry into the information services industry would have a detrimental effect on
First Amendment values.
In 1987, during the first triennial review of the decree, the Justice Department and the
RBOCs recommended that the ban on entry into the information services market be lifted because
market conditions had changed significantly and entry would have positive effects on the industry.
Further, some RBOCs argued the ban should be removed because it infringed the RBOCs' First
Amendment rights. In response, the court ruled that the RBOCs could enter the information
services market as transmission providers, but not as information providers. The information ser-
vices had to be owned by other non-affiliated firms. The court also briefly addressed the RBOCs'
First Amendment arguments and dismissed them on several grounds. First, the RBOCs, like other
companies are subject to antitrust regulations of which the consent decree restrictions are a part.
Second, because the RBOCs were common carriers, they enjoyed a different status from other
network providers which retained speech rights. Third, there was in fact no infringement of
RBOC speech rights because, upon the proper showing, the previously agreed upon ban could be
lifted.
Upon RBOC appeal of the court's decision, the circuit court ruled that the district court
could not require the RBOCs to establish that market conditions had changed given the fact that
no party to the court administered consent decree was challenging the assertion. Further, the
district court was required to apply a different standard to assess the advisability of removing the
restrictions as the parties recommended. The circuit court did not, however, reach the First
Amendment issue. In the subsequent remand by the circuit court of appeals, the district court
reluctantly removed the restriction.
From 1988 to 1992, the RBOCs also sought relief from the cross-ownership ban through a
variety of bills proposing to allow telephone company entry into the video transmission and provi-
sion market. See H.R. Rep. No. 1504, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. Rep. No. 1200, 102d
Cong. Ist Sess. (1991); H.R. Rep. No. 2546, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); 2800, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1990); S. Rep. No. 1068, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. (S. 1989); H.R. Rep. No. 2437 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (companion legislation to S. 1068). However, telco provision of video pro-
gramming, which was seen as an alternative to re-regulation of cable television rates and prac-
tices, was not adopted by Congress despite significant support from the then sitting president.
Instead, the cable industry was substantially re-regulated. In 1993, S. 1504, a new bill which
proposes to remove the cross ownership restriction, has been introduced. Yet, in all the legislation
which has addressed the issue of telco ownership of video distribution facilities, and, despite efforts
by telephone companies to raise the constitutional speech issue before the FCC and the MFJ
court, to date there are only two references to First Amendment speech issues in previously unsuc-
cessful legislation. See H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 31 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4668 (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (ex-
plaining the relationship between the telephone-cable cross-ownership prohibition and the First
Amendment goal of diversity of ownership and viewpoint)). See also S. 1200, Communications
Competitiveness and Infrastructure Modernization Act of 1991, S. 1200, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991).
The Congress makes the following findings:. . . (14) A broadband communications infra-
structure will be every American's tool of personal emancipation; will generate a quantum
increase in Americans' freedom of speech.
Id. § 101(14).
The issue was addressed a second time when Congress determined that its codification of the
FCC's telephone-cable television cross-ownership rules was constitutional.
Finally, the issue was addressed in the context of FCC deliberations concerning its telephone
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speech on cable television and local telephone switched networks will be
revised to accommodate increased network owner control. The scope of
user access and speech rights most likely would be established by con-
tract or tariff and reflect the relative bargaining power of the parties.129
In such a scenario and in the absence of state action13 0 small users and
individuals would have access and speech rights solely at the sufferance
of the network provider/owner, and the specter of private censorship
unmediated by government becomes quite real.
Should the must carry rules be upheld based upon economic mar-
ket and antitrust regulation and the telephone company prohibition
overturned, at minimum, opportunities for access and speech would
continue to incorporate the current statutory delineations of common
carriage, leased access, public access and network owner access.' 31 Op-
portunities for speech would be broadened to include telephone network
owner/speakers and cable network speakers, as well as the merged
cable-telephone network owner/speaker, and would continue to include
unaffiliated information provider "speech" and user/subscriber speech.
Under this set of outcomes, the focus of access and speech policy ar-
guably shifts to a government-mediated inquiry into the extent and the
manner in which the owner/provider may limit or prohibit the exercise
of access and speech rights by potential and actual user/subscribers. So
company-cable television cross-ownership restriction. Collectively, in these proceedings, the gov-
ernment has set forth its rationale for why its decision to continue the imposition of the restriction
on local telephone company provision of video programming is constitutional.
The government's argument is essentially as follows. The telephone-cable television cross-
ownership ban is justified by the First Amendment interest "in the widest possible dissemination
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources." Through their control of access to their
local transmission and switching monopolies, the telephone companies could reduce or eliminate
competition in electronic publishing, thereby reducing diversity. Therefore, the removal of the ban
would threaten the First Amendment interest in diversity.
The ban does not violate the First Amendment rights of local telephone companies for several
reasons. First, the ban is an anti-trust prohibition similar to those which other media companies
are also subject. Second, common carriers are treated differently for purposes of the First Amend-
ment. Third, the ban is a content neutral restriction which incidentally affects speech. It is nar-
rowly tailored to meet the substantial government interests in preventing anticompetitive abuses
by telephone carriers possessing monopoly power and in maintaining a competitive environment
for broadband communications.
129. See generally In re Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace Petitions
for Modification of Fresh Look Policy, 8 F.C.C.R. 5046 (1993); and In re Competition in the
Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, 6 F.C.C.R. 7569 (1991). See also Victor J. Toth, To
Tariff or not to Tariff-That's No Longer the Question; Federal Communications Commission
Tariffs, Bus. CoMNI. REv., Jan. 1993, at 60.
130. See infra note 6.
131. See generally Daniels Cablevision, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1 (1993).
[Vol. 55:1085
HeinOnline  -- 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1132 1993-1994
PRIVATE NETWORKS, PUBLIC SPEECH
long as owner/providers and network users retain access and speech
rights, the First Amendment is likely to be better served. For reasons
stated above, an equally probable outcome will be modification-if not
outright repeal---of the must carry rules and repeal of the cable-tele-
phone cross ownership prohibition.
VI. CONCLUSION: A SHIFT IN PARADIGMS?
The convergence and privatization of telecommunications net-
works will continue as a market and technological reality and as a pre-
ferred regulatory tool. While the outcome of the Turner and C & P
cases will affect the scope of network owner control over access and
content, questions regarding the scope of access to private networks and
the extent of private network control over content will remain. For in-
stance, in the event Turner is overturned and C & P upheld, how may
telephone and cable network owners establish criteria for access and
speech on their networks? In the context of private action by network
owners, how might the government seek affirmatively to ensure sub-
scriber/user access and relatively unfettered speech, while avoiding in-
appropriate regulation of network owner speech?
Access presents a particularly interesting set of problems. For in-
stance, to the extent government regulation of network owner control
over access is based upon technical scarcity, we may be approaching a
time when technical scarcity will cease to be a credible concern. 132 Ad-
mittedly, however, an abundance of technical channel or switching ca-
pacity does not assure access to all potential users. Market place fail-
ures due to wealth distribution, limited network infrastructure
availability, and selective market competition will still play a significant
role.
These questions of speech and access are doubly critical given the
current proposed mergers. To the extent that large telephone and cable
corporations are allowed to merge, economic scarcity will remain a
valid policy concern. Aside from reducing potential competitors while
driving up the price for market entry, the types of services made availa-
132. At least one communications expert asserts that there is no shortage of available spec-
trum, only a shortage of current human ingenuity to harness it. He points to the history of spec-
trum development and management wherein new technology allows the use of portions of previ-
ously "unusable" spectrum as well as the more efficient use of available spectrum vis compression
techniques. See George Gilder, What Spectrum Shortage?, FORBES, May 27, 1991, at 328-330.
Similarly, digital, switched interactive telecommunications networks can provide another source of
increasing capacity for the transmission of information to the home. Consequently, they too re-
duce scarcity. See generally Miller, supra note 10.
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ble and the manner in which they are priced by the merged firms will
affect who will have access to network functionalities. If the post-
merger economics follow the same trends as prior periods of merger in
related media industries such as broadcasting, debt service demands
will ultimately force the merged firms to cut costs, serve more lucrative
markets and raise prices.'33 In such an event, some market segments
may receive less service while other segments pay more. Such develop-
ments would certainly affect the cost of access, may preclude signifi-
cant segments of the market from having meaningful access, and will
affect the speech activities of those who acquire access.
Some scholars have argued that the nation's constitutional laws be
changed to reflect the growth of speech related activity engendered by
the convergence of computer, network switching and fiber optic tech-
nologies. For instance, at least one eminent constitutional scholar has
argued that the First Amendment should be amended to protect speech
activities conducted over computers. 3 1 Other scholars have argued that
the First Amendment, in its current form, may be interpreted to pro-
tect access and speech activities conducted over computer-augmented,
broadband, interactive switched networks.3 5
Short of constitutional solutions, however, the government retains
other regulatory tools for assuring "universal" access and relatively un-
fettered speech for network owners and users. Government may address
these problems reactively (antitrust, liability for content, and tort lia-
bility) or proactively (setting minimum technical parameters for net-
works which favor distributed intelligence and switched interactive net-
133. Andrea Adelson, Radio Station Consolidation Threatens Small Operators, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 1993, at D1; Edmund L. Andrews, Plan to Ease Rule on Buying Radio Stations,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 1992, at D1; 1985: A Year Like No Other for the Fifth Estate; Changes in
the Broadcasting Industry, BROADCASTING, Dec. 30, 1985, at 38.
134. Resnick, supra note 53, at 32. Speaking at a recent conference on computers, freedom
and privacy in San Francisco, Laurence H. Tribe, a professor of constitutional law at Harvard
Law School, called for an amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would protect privacy, speech
and other constitutional rights made possible in part, but now threatened by computer technology.
The Tribe Amendment reads, in full:
This Constitution's protections for the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assem-
bly, and its protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and the deprivation of
life, liberty or property without due process of law, shall be construed as fully applicable
without regard to the technological method or medium through which information content
is generated, stored, altered, transmitted or controlled.
Resnick, supra note 53. In Professor Tribe's view, the current constitutional amendments do not
protect the rights of computer users adequately. See id. at 1.
135. See generally Hammond, supra note 83. See also Perrit, supra note 115, at 334-35.
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work technologies), and a universal service requirement to assure
access and speech in the face of the above mentioned market failures.
Control of employee and subscriber speech is problematic for all
the reasons mentioned before. There clearly are legitimate and compel-
ling reasons for employer or network owner limits on employee or sub-
scriber speech in some instances. Nevertheless, the potential for private
censorship remains great and its negative impact is no less devastating
to the individual than when engaged in by the government.
The impact of these risks can be positively affected by the exercise
of regulatory choices that federal and state governments now have
before them. These regulatory choices affect the exercise of access and
editorial control at the content, network configuration and equipment
levels-the same levels at which network owners exert control.
Given the extensive cost of deploying fiber optics to the home, fed-
eral and state regulators could allow private industry to continue to
build network information delivery systems composed of one-way, com-
pressed channel technology (cable and video dial tone) rather than
switched, two-way, interactive technology (ISDN/broadband). While
this approach may be favored by portions of the industry, there is a
significant danger that such a solution would postpone the advent of
switched interactive multi-media communications. More important,
however, it replicates the current regulatory difficulties that accrue
when the government cedes control over distinct, clearly discernable
transmission paths to network owners and then imposes liability for
speech.
At the network intelligence and applications level, the government
has initiated regulatory proceedings aimed at equalizing user intercon-
nection to the local monopoly public switched network architecture,
and increasing network service offerings by enhancing network flexibil-
ity through distributed network intelligence. These proceedings have
yet to be concluded. A resolution favoring distributed intelligence and
shared user/network control over network functionalities would maxi-
mize speaker control over the process by which information is
communicated.
Where the network owner exercises control over the network via
access or content control to deter or forestall competition the antitrust
laws also should be applicable.136
As privatization continues, the lessons learned in Cubby, Inc. v.
136. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1945).
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Compuserve and alluded to in other recent cases regarding publisher
liability, should give would-be private network editors pause. Where a
network owner exercises control over access and content, they may not
be able to avoid liability for that content when it is harmful to the
public. 137 Similarly, network owners may be held liable for negligent or
careless manipulation and control of subscriber/user information where
such action results in injury to the user or to third parties.138 Certainly,
the libel, obscenity and indecency laws will continue to make control of
content a cause for liability. Thus, even where network owners seek to
eschew all content regulation, they are likely to be no more successful
than telephone common carriers and cable operators who by statute
must exert some control over obscene or indecent subscriber speech.
Ultimately, self-preservation and protection of the bottom line may mo-
tivate firm efforts to curb libelous speech. Yet, forgoing editorial con-
trol of content would remove a downside cost of doing business that
may be preferable to the cost of maintaining the monitoring of sub-
scriber and programmer speech and the potential liability which the
exercise of editorial control brings.
There is another way in which network owner control of speech
may be tempered by government sanction-the imposition of tort lia-
bility. The exercise of control over access and content necessarily in-
vites expectations that the network owner, in the exercise of its edito-
rial discretion, has reviewed and sanctioned all information which it
transmits. Moreover, should the network owner lose or damage cus-
tomer information in storage, manipulation or transmission, or, negli-
gently preclude the transmission of customer information entrusted to
its care, it is reasonable to require that the owner compensate the cus-
tomer to the extent of its legally recognized tort damages. A recent
case in Illinois had so held based on state law.1 39
137. For instance, Soldier of Fortune Magazine was recently held liable for an advertise-
ment it published which the court interpreted as, inter alia, soliciting contract killing jobs. See
Ronald Smothers, Soldier of Fortune Magazine Held Liable for Killer's Ad, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
19, 1992, at 18. See also supra note 46 (discussing Compuserve and Prodigy).
138. "Providers of goods and services created using computer and information technologies
face increasingly greater exposure to liability when things go awry." See Sookman, supra note 72,
at 141-46.
139. At least one state has limited the applicability of telephone carriers exculpatory lan-
guage to ordinary negligence and does not allow disclaimers for acts of gross negligence, willful
neglect or misconduct. See State OKs Liability Disclaimers for Telcos, 130 PUB. UTIL. FoRT. 42,
Dec. 15, 1992.
The Supreme Court for the State of Illinois recently overturned the lower court ruling. It
determined that parties suffering economic injury totaling millions of dollars as a result of a severe
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At least one commentator has noted that in an era of deregulation,
the reasons for continuing to limit the tort liability of non-dominant
telecommunications common carriers cease to be applicable. 140 At least
three reasons have been used by the courts to justify the continuation
of exculpation clauses limiting common carrier liability. First, federal
and state regulators may be held to possess the regulatory authority to
establish such limits. Second, absent such limits, judgements paid by
monopoly carriers would be passed on to subscribers having no alterna-
tive service providers. Third, limited liability provisions preserve na-
tional uniformity in the provision of services and avoid discrimination
between like-situated but geographically dispersed subscribers.
Today, however, such reasons retain little credibility. First, the
Communications Act of 1934, does not authorize federal regulators to
preempt state law tort remedies then existing at common law or by
statute. Rather, such remedies as the act provides are in addition to
existing state remedies.14 In addition, courts have not automatically
granted primary jurisdiction over state tort liability claims to regula-
tory agencies but often have found such claims to be within the pur-
view of the courts. 42 Second, in an era of convergence and expanding
competition at all market levels in the telecommunications and, ulti-
mately, multi-media marketplace, many subscribers increasingly have,
and will continue to have, alternative sources of service. Finally, in an
era of privatization, in which a substantial portion of the existing tele-
communications infrastructure is owned by a growing disparate num-
ber of private owners serving distinct "high-end user" sub-markets
rather than the larger local or national markets of various subscribers,
fire at an Illinois Bell switch could not recover. The court held that the parties' statutory claims
for economic losses were not recoverable in a tort action and that the exculpatory language in
Illinois Bell's tariff properly limited claims for disruption of service to compensation for the cost of
the calls. See In re Illinois Bell Switching Station Litig., No. 73999, 1994 I11. LEXIS 97 (Ill. July
28, 1994).
For a summary of the impact of the Hinsdale switch fire on subscribers, see generally Art
Barnum, Bell Fire Fiasco Rings in Memory Five Years Later, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 30, 1993, at 2. See
also Central Office Fiascos Expose User Vulnerability, Network World, July 18, 1988, at 34;
Barton Crockett, Citing Negligence, Users File Suits Against Illinois Bell, NETWORK WORLD,
June 6, 1988, at 1 (discussing the law suits against Illinois Bell alleging millions of dollars in
damages due to a fire in the Hinsdale central office stitch); and Barton Crockett, Users Seek
Damages From Illinois Bell; Companies Charge BOC with Inadequate Fire Prevention in Wake
of Hinsdale Co. Disaster, NETWORK WORLD, May 23, 1988, p. 11.
140. See Christy Cornell Kunin, Unilateral Tariff Exculpation in the Era of Competitive
Telecommunications, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 907, 932-37 (1992).
141. 47 U.S.C. § 414 (1988).
142. Kunin, supra note 140, at 914-15, 928.
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national uniformity appears to be less a function of government action
and more a function of the relative market power of the service pro-
vider, the purchaser and market demand. For these reasons, govern-
ment-sanctioned, carrier-initiated limitations on tort liability should be
abolished except where a carrier elects to serve all classes of customers
via public switched multi-media networks.
A decision to remove the tort liability limitation except when ap-
plied to carriers serving the majority of all classes of users via a public
switched multi-media network or providing significant interconnection
between public switched networks, would serve as a financial incentive
for some carriers to maintain service to a broad subscriber base, or to
expand their service offerings to include other consumer groups, or, at
the very least, assure sufficient compatible interconnection.
Where the non-dominant network provider or providers resort to
contracts or tariffs as the vehicle for the offering of services to subscrib-
ers, there may be instances in which the doctrine of contract unconscio-
nability may be invoked. If the network owner, as provider of scarce
network resources, leveraged its economic position by employing form
contract language to limit its tort liability, it's attempt to enforce such
restrictions might be denied by the courts on the grounds of unconscio-
nability.14 3 Moreover, as one public service commission has observed,
given the increasing complexity of tariffs it would be ". . 'unconscion-
able' to assume that any telephone subscriber had consented either im-
pliedly or expressly to broad liability waivers. 144
Each of the above-mentioned policies affects the incentive struc-
ture under which information carriers would exercise control of access
and speech on their networks. None of the proposed policies is inconsis-
tent with established constitutional law. They do not preclude network
owner exercise of control over access and speech. They merely remove
liability protections enjoyed by public common carriers, expand techni-
143. It has been aptly observed that:
the law, by protecting the unequal distribution of property, does nothing to prevent free-
dom of contract from becoming a one-sided privilege. Society, by proclaiming freedom of
contract, guarantees that it will not interfere with the exercise of power by contract. Free-
dom of contract enable enterprises to legislate by contract and, what is even more impor-
tant, to legislate in a substantially authoritarian manner without using the appearance of
authoritarian forms.
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L.
REv. 629, 640-41 (1943).
144. Cross, supra note 69, at 35 (quoting In re Equicom Communications, Inc., 109 Purdon
4th, 540 (1990)).
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cal opportunities for user access and speech, and continue pre-existing
economic regulation. As such, they should be adopted as regulatory
policy regardless of whether constitutional law is changed.
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